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ABSTRACT 
Before 1991, the United States military’s demand for additional 
communications bandwidth and timely intelligence was rising rapidly.  Since then, 
with the advent of the Global War on Terrorism, it has increased substantially.  
To address this growing need, the Department of Defense has focused its 
acquisition and procurement efforts on obtaining new communications and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms that can help 
lessen shortfalls and possibly exploit new, untapped resources.   
Recently, there has been an increasing focus on new technology, such as 
tactical satellites or high-altitude long-endurance airships, as a way to increase 
communications and intelligence collection capacities.  Likewise, advances in the 
capabilities of medium-altitude and high-altitude unmanned aerial systems have 
resulted in a more prominent role for them on today’s battlefield.  Each of these 
vehicles has a unique niche in today’s military, but the increasing capabilities of 
each are beginning to create some overlap in their uses.  
This study will conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis on these systems for 
use as a persistent communications and ISR platform.  In particular, it will 
measure the effectiveness of each for comparison, and will offer possibilities to 
increase the overall effective use of the three together to maximize performance 
and cost.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
. . . in each major conflict over the past decade, senior military 
commanders reported shortfalls in tactical space capabilities, such 
as those intended to provide communications and imagery data to 
the warfighter in theater.1 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
The current Department of Defense (DoD) investment in medium altitude, 
high altitude, and tactical space persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) and communications platforms does not currently meet 
warfighter operational requirements. 
B.  BACKGROUND  
1. The Search for a New Solution 
In response to the increasing demand for ISR and long-range 
communications, the DoD is seeking out developmental capabilities to provide 
this support.  Millions of dollars in development and acquisition funding have 
been expended on programs that promise commanders additional bandwidth, 
additional remote sensing capabilities, and can act as a network relay to sustain 
these requirements.  Traditionally, long-haul communications, remote sensing, 
and other intelligence capabilities have been primarily provided by satellites 
designed specifically to meet the projected needs of strategic users.  As demand 
has increased beyond those projections, the ability of the on-orbit platforms to 
provide the capability that users have come to expect has become an increasing 
challenge.   
                                            
1 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DoD Is Making Progress to Rapidly Deliver Low Cost Space Capabilities, 
but Challenges Remain, August 25, 2008, U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 23, 2008 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08516.pdf>. 
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Historically, satellites were viewed as a strategic asset, unavailable except 
at the highest levels.  There are many reasons why this view persisted.  First, 
satellites are expensive and are designed to provide a specific strategic 
intelligence capability or fill a specific strategic communications need.  The 
capability of these assets to provide additional intelligence to the operational or 
tactical user outside of fulfilling this primary strategic role may be either more 
than the platform could sustain or more than its primary users are willing to give.  
Secondly, the cost of satellite design, development, maintenance, and control 
precluded any idea that all users would have separate, dedicated systems 
optimized for their particular requirements.  The limited capability of earlier 
versions of these assets and the viewpoint that satellites were rare and precious 
commodities that should be maintained solely for supporting strategic intelligence 
and communications requirements, led to their limited tactical availability.   
Therefore, in response to this increased demand the DoD has continued to seek 
out and develop affordable alternatives for remote sensing and communications 
needs. 
An early alternative used to improve the remote sensing and 
communications was the adaptation and development of drones into unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV).  Originally used as targets for ground to air defense 
practice, these vehicles, once adapted with sensor or communications payloads, 
quickly became viable alternatives to manned reconnaissance missions or new 
satellite payloads.  Early versions of these UAVs were constrained in capabilities 
compared to satellites due to their limited flight duration and payloads.  As 
technological improvements have increased the capabilities of UAVs, DoD 
investment in UAV development and acquisition has increased.  Another platform 
widely used for visual reconnaissance in the early part of the 20th century was 
the airship.  Although earlier versions were susceptible to ground munitions and 
were quickly replaced by reconnaissance aircraft as technology improved, newer 
versions of the high altitude airship have recently emerged as a viable option to 
provide sustained ISR and communications relay at altitudes that are often 
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beyond the reach of ground threats.  A third alternative, involving a paradigm 
shift in traditional thinking is the development of cost-effective, small, tactical 
satellites designed to meet the needs of tactical users.  Developing small tactical 
satellite capabilities to support the persistent remote sensing and 
communications needs of the military has become a major focus of technology 
developers across the DoD and commercial industry.  Each of these alternatives 
(unmanned aerial vehicles, high altitude airships, and tactical satellites) has 
advantages and disadvantages, both in their individual capability to meet the 
remote sensing and communications needs of military users and in their ability to 
provide military users with this capability in a timely and cost-effective manner. 
2. The Need for an Analysis of Alternatives 
Because of the vast amount of procurement dollars being invested into 
each of these intelligence and communications platforms, an essential step is to 
conduct an analysis to determine which can provide the desired capabilities in 
the most cost-effective manner.  Such an analysis would allow decision makers 
to procure the most effective platform, or combination of platforms, that would 
maximize the desired capabilities while minimizing acquisition and procurement 
costs.  However, no study of this nature has been conducted to date, perhaps 
because each of the platforms, in the past, had been used in a particular niche 
that was unique to that platform (i.e., the capabilities of each were so distinct that 
making a comparison was unnecessary).  Another potential reason that no 
previous studies have been conducted is the frantic pace that technology 
development has maintained to meet the demands of the DoD in its Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT).  This operational pace has compelled the DoD to utilize 
whatever assets were proven and demonstrated in order to satisfy military 
intelligence and communications needs. However, the capabilities of these three 
platforms have slowly started to merge to a level that makes a comparison more 
realistic and necessary.  Technological advancements have made the payloads 
aboard airships and unmanned aerial vehicles comparable to what once could 
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only be found aboard satellites in orbit.  The distinct advantage that satellites 
once held in their ability to provide sustained coverage of target areas has slowly 
diminished as technology improvements in airships and UAVs have begun to 
provide them with the ability to stay on station for long duration missions.  
Likewise, the exorbitant cost of orbiting platforms has led the Department of 
Defense to seek out other alternatives to alleviate the ever-growing need of users 
for intelligence products and communications bandwidth.  Each of these factors 
now makes a comparison of these platforms a necessary, logical step toward 
maximizing effectiveness and legitimizing spending.   
DoD decision makers evaluating products from competing industry 
providers are required to conduct standard and streamlined cost comparisons 
between programs.  Guidance on how these comparisons are to be conducted is 
given by the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in OMB 
Circular A-76, which states, “ ...  an agency shall calculate, compare, and certify 
costs ...  to determine and document a cost-effective performance decision”.2  
One approach to comparisons is by conducting a cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  A 
CBA is a method of analysis developed to evaluate investment and policy issues.  
Using this method of analysis, decision makers identify the gains and losses from 
a proposal, convert these gains and losses into monetary units, and then 
compare them, with the ultimate goal of deciding whether the proposal is 
beneficial for investment.3  However, since TacSats, UAVs, and HAAs, are 
individually seen as viable resources for answering identified needs, these 
vehicles will continue to be developed and used by the DoD to meet the 
battlefield communications and intelligence needs.  Therefore, a CBA of these 
systems is unnecessary.  As the technological capabilities of these systems 
improve, so too does the likelihood that they will begin to overlap in their ability to 
cover mission areas that once belonged to a singular platform.  As this possibility 
                                            
2  Whitehouse Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-76 (Revised):  Performance of 
Commercial Activites (Washington, D.C., 2003). 
3  Tevfik F. Nas, Cost-benefit Analysis: Theory and Application (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 1996). 
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becomes more and more an actuality, an obvious question arises: "Am I using 
the correct balance of available platforms to achieve mission success 
(effectiveness) at the lowest available cost?"  To answer this question, one must 
conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).  This type of analysis usually takes 
on one of two forms:  a) use of a fixed monetary value with an analysis of 
alternatives (AoA) based on the level of benefit provided, or b) a fixed benefit 
level and an AoA based on the level of cost required to obtain that level of 
benefit.4   
To conduct an evaluation, common ground for comparison between the 
three platforms must be established.  Comparisons based solely on their current 
employment would do little to improve understanding for DoD decision makers.  
First, there are unique capabilities that each of these platforms has that will 
continue to make them the primary choice for use in that particular need.  For 
example, UAVs can provide streaming video to users on the ground, a capability 
that does not currently exists with satellites.  To compare these three platforms in 
their ability to provide streaming video would not help DoD investors decide the 
best investment opportunities.  For comparison to be made, we must decide 
upon a level playing field, consisting of capabilities all three can provide (with 
some variations in ability), and an analysis and comparison of each.   
Another requirement for this analysis is to establish a standard for 
effective intelligence and communications platforms and then make a 
comparison between our three chosen vehicles to determine how effectively 
each is able to provide this level of need with respect to cost.  This will help us to 
answer the question of each platforms ability to meet these user requirements 
(i.e., their effectiveness) which can then be weighed against the amount of 
investment required to meet that requirement (i.e., cost).     
Also necessary is to determine the scope of the capabilities to be 
compared between the three platforms.  As stated earlier, each of these three 
                                            
4  Edith Stokey and Richard Edition Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis, 1st ed. (New 
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vehicles has unique capabilities that are specific to that platform.  A comparison 
of the three can only be made in the areas in which they have commonality.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, two primary mission areas will be used 
for comparison.  The first area is in the ability of each of these platforms to 
provide electro-optical (EO) remote sensing.  EO remote sensing provides 
commanders with many unique decision-making options. Some of these options 
include the ability to see potential targets before deciding to conduct operations 
in the area, allowing targets to be tracked for changes to determine activity, 
depicting avenues of ingress or egress so that objectives may be more 
accurately secured, and providing commanders with views of potential targets 
outside the normal spectrum of visual imagery (e.g. infrared).  The second area 
for comparison is in the ability of each platform to provide long-haul 
communications between remote units on.  These mission areas (EO remote 
sensing and long haul communications) were chosen for several reasons.  First, 
because each of these platforms has the potential to perform these missions, 
and there is continuing research and development into the improvement of each 
to provide this service.  Secondly, and more importantly, we chose these areas of 
comparison because they represent the most common mission capabilities that 
are required from these types of platforms for service to military users on today’s 
battlefield. 
With these bounds established for this analysis, it is necessary then to 
understand the capabilities and limitations of each platform.  The following 
chapters will focus on providing this information, together with an understanding 
of their ability to meet the operational needs. 
 
                                            
York:W.W. Norton, 1978). 
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C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold.  First, it is to capture in one place key 
information relevant to persistent ISR and communications platforms.  Second, is 
to conduct a sound cost effectiveness analysis to determine the best use of 
future DoD research and development and procurement funds in the areas of 
persistent ISR and communications platforms. 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will take the view of the ground forces commander and will 
bound its analysis to one medium altitude UAS, one high altitude UAS, one High-
Altitude Long-Endurance Airship, and two tactical space representative platforms 
measured against the following five attributes: responsiveness, access, 
coverage, endurance, and flexibility. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The following methodology will be used to conduct the analysis.  First, the 
issues and mission tasks shall be determined.  During this phase, representative 
platforms will be selected for the analysis.  Next, the Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) to assess the platforms’ abilities to satisfy the mission tasks shall be 
developed.  The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) will be used to model the 
decision among alternatives, derive associated criteria weights and evaluate 
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II. BACKGROUND 
USPACOM requires pervasive and persistent surveillance to 
understand adversary plans and intended actions. The size of our 
theater and scarcity of available assets hampers opportunities to 
shape the environment. To improve this situation, USPACOM 
would welcome new resources  new sensors to increase dwell and 
access to potential adversary territory and communications and 
more human intelligence. These capabilities are critical to 
preventing strategic or tactical surprise.  
Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, 
before the House Armed Services Committee, 12 March 2008. 5 
In testimony to Congress, the U.S. Combatant Commanders have 
expressed the urgent need for increased levels of long-range communications to 
reduce dependency on commercial satellite communications and to assure 
tactical level access to wideband communications and the need for persistent 
ISR capabilities to ensure more rapid tactical dissemination of critical intelligence.  
These capabilities have traditionally been provided by space-based assets.  
However, military communication satellites often cannot provide the required 
capacity, and our ISR assets cannot meet battlefield commanders’ requirements 
in a timely manner, if at all.  Therefore, the DoD must consider alternative 
methods of meeting these requirements since launching enough large space-
based assets to meet all requirements is cost prohibitive.  Admiral Timothy 
Keating, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, captured COCOM sentiments 
when he stated, “surveillance is a significant requirement of ours, and the 
platform that satisfies the requirement is of less interest than is the overarching 
requirement.  The requirement still exists."6 
                                            
5  Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 12 March 2008, March 
12, 2008, August 20, 2008 <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/us/2008/keating_031208.html>. 
6  National Reconnaissance Office cancels contracts for proposed space radar project (4/4/08) -- 
www.GovernmentExecutive.com, July 17, 2008 
<http://governmentexecutive.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=39713&ref=rellink>. 
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It is now widely accepted that the U.S. military reliance on space-based 
systems could be our Achilles heel.7  Therefore, in an effort to find alternative 
ways of meeting our information demands and to avoid disproportionate 
vulnerabilities of space assets, the DoD has begun to explore alternatives.  
Technological advances have provided a number of improvements in the 
capabilities of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), the development of high-
altitude long-endurance (HALE) airships, and a renewed interest in small 
“tactical” satellites (TacSats) brought on by the Operationally Responsive Space 
(ORS) initiative.  Proponents of these technologies would argue that they are a 
cheaper and a more effective answer to identified shortfalls than is the expansion 
of large national communications and ISR satellite constellations.  Opponents 
argue that these alternatives are unnecessary and a dangerous diversion of 
precious resources that could be better used to improve established systems like 
the current generation of UAS and national technical means.  In truth, each of 
these systems has uses for which it may be the better option.  Likewise, there 
are disadvantages inherent to each.  The following sections are a synopsis of 
each type of platform and details on the five specific representative systems we 
will use in our cost effectiveness analysis. 
A. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
1. History 
The idea of using drones or remotely controlled aircraft has been around 
almost as long as manned aircraft.  During World War I, unmanned aircraft were 
used as flying bombs, and by World War II, they were being used as flying 
targets or for conducting reconnaissance missions.8  Today these vehicles are 
referred to as Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or UAS, to reflect the idea that they 
                                            
7 Scott R. Maethner, Achilles' Heel: Space and Information Power in the 21st Century, 2007), August 
20, 2008 <www.schriever.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070906-082.pdf>. 
8 "The fly's a spy - Unmanned aircraft; Unmanned aircraft," The Economist 385.8553 (2007) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1376399991&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
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are much more than mere drones or bomb platforms.  They are used extensively 
in the Global War on Terrorism in a variety of missions ranging from active 
intelligence collection and reporting, to kinetic strikes (with armed missiles) 
against targets.  With the success of the U.S. Air Force Predator, originally 
fielded in 1995, these unmanned systems have taken on new prominence as 
intelligence collection platforms, using a variety of new sensors and new payload 
technologies.   
2. Current Capabilities 
The current inventory of UAS is based on the mission needs identified by 
each of the military services.  That inventory has grown from about 200 units in 
2002 to nearly 6,000 units in 2008.  Approximately 1,500 of those are currently 
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Army UAS in Iraq flew more than 46,450 hours 
in March 2008.9  These platforms are combat proven. 
Each service has established a tiered system to classify and separate 
their UAS platform inventory based on their identified usage.  These identification 
schemes are not, however, identical among the services.  In general, however, 
Tier I systems are low altitude, long endurance in nature (currently filled by the 
Gnat 750, Dragon Eye, or the RQ-11B Raven B).  Tier II systems are medium 
altitude and long endurance systems (currently filled by the MQ-1 Predator, 
ScanEagle, and the RQ-2 Pioneer).  Tier III systems are high altitude, and long 
endurance in nature (currently filled by the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and the Shadow 
Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System).10 
The current UAS capability to conduct remote sensing missions is varied 
and growing.  Like space-based systems, a UAS can conduct imagery 
intelligence using a variety of electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors to 
provide imagery intelligence in the form of high-resolution photography.  By doing 
                                            
9  Jeff Horne, Space Operations (Huntsville, AL 2008).  
10  Glenn W. Goodman Jr, "Three Tiers," Sea Power 49.7 (2006) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1082432511&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
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so, these systems provide ground commanders with the ability to view potential 
target locations or objectives within a few moments of actually attacking or 
occupying them.  However, a UAS can also provide a capability that no satellite 
currently can provide: real-time video feeds.  Video capabilities open up the 
potential for unparalleled real-time target tracking, allowing commanders the 
ability to make decisions based on real-time target behavior.  In addition, unlike 
tasking national assets, which is often time consuming and may be 
unresponsive, the real-time tasking ability of a UAS to conduct this type of 
mission provides the warfighter with an ability unheard of only a decade or two 
ago.  Similar to the unique ability to task these systems, is the ability to adapt 
their use based on changing situations.  This provides commanders with the 
flexibility to asses and change coverage as the situation on the battlefield 
dictates. 
New payload technologies under development will soon provide 
interesting sensors for UAS that could make their role in future combat 
operations even more vital.  By integrating sensor suites into the very skin of the 
aircraft, new sensor technology is working to provide future UAS platforms with 
the ability to provide sensing capabilities that previously were only available with 
overhead satellites.11  Specifically, ongoing research is working toward 
developing sensors that would equip current UAS aircraft with a number of 
innovative improvements, to include multispectral and hyperspectral imagery, 
enhanced synthetic aperture radar technology, and light detection and ranging 
(LIDAR) for foliage penetration and image collection.12  
                                            
11 David A. Fulghum, Douglas Barrie, and Robert Wall, "Sensors Vs. Airframes," Aviation Week & 
Space Technology 165.17 (2006) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1165402831&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
12  "Emerging Sensors Technologies for Unmanned Aircraft Systems," Military Technology 30.5 (2006) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1067401631&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
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a.  Advantages 
Some of the advantages of unmanned aircraft have remained 
unchanged from their inception.  Reconnaissance missions are inherently 
dangerous and, if compromised, can result in extreme risk to personnel involved 
and cause targets to “dry up” because of the lost advantage of surprise.  In 
addition, unmanned aircraft are uniquely capable of penetrating areas that may 
be too dangerous for piloted aircraft.  Undetected, an overhead reconnaissance 
platform can provide the necessary mitigation to prevent needlessly endangering 
pilots while still allowing military commanders a way to collect valuable battlefield 
intelligence.  The flexibility to adapt to changes on the battlefield, which was 
discussed earlier, is one of the other primary advantages UAS platforms provide.  
Orbiting satellite intelligence platforms are much less responsive to the fluidity of 
the modern battlefield.  Another advantage that unmanned aircraft systems hold 
over traditional reconnaissance techniques is that they do not have the same 
physiological limitations as human pilots or reconnaissance forces on the ground.  
An unmanned aerial system can be utilized on every mission to maximize its 
performance limitations to provide target coverage.  Human limitations make this 
technique very dangerous for extended periods with manned collection platforms.  
Additionally, the use of UAS platforms for reconnaissance brings with it a 
reduced footprint within the theater of operations, and a greatly reduced support 
requirement.  Traditional aerial surveillance and intelligence collection techniques 
bring with them a support infrastructure that is usually large and expensive to 
maintain.  Support requirements of UAS platforms are usually equivalent to a 
small company (~82 personnel) for four UAVs.13 
                                            
13  Daniel P. McCutchon, Daniel P., McKenzie, Timothy M., and Townsend, Kelvin J., "Comparing the 
Utility of a Semi-Rigid Lighter-Than-Air Vehicle to a Tactical Satellite Cluster and High Endurance 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles In Performing Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance," Master 
of Science in Systems Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2005, 73. 
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b.  Disadvantages 
There are, however, many significant disadvantages to using 
unmanned aircraft for intelligence collection.  In order to increase endurance the 
sensors carried aboard UAS platforms have traditionally been small and provided 
limited collection capability.  Although technology research in sensor 
development has made tremendous improvements over the last decade, and 
continues to show great promise for the future, smaller UAS platforms can only 
carry a modest payload and their EO capabilities are still not equal to that of our 
orbiting national systems.  The flexibility of UAS platforms provides unparalleled 
last minute updates on target changes.  However, they have never been 
considered a replacement system for satellite collections, with their stabilized 
payloads and highly sensitive and extensive collection capability.  Future 
improvements to UAS sensor payloads potentially could change this capability, 
however. 
Secondly, as the use of UAS platforms becomes more and more 
prevalent, the potential exists for these systems to interfere with or even cause 
potential harm to other, manned aircraft.  As the use of UAS platforms has 
increased, and as each of the service components within the Department of 
Defense has increased their dependence on their use for tactical advantage, 
concern has grown about the safety of the extensive use of these systems in an 
environment that traditionally has been the exclusive domain of manned aircraft.  
Although established safety regulations are prescribed to prevent this type of 
accident, with the increased proliferation of UAS systems comes the increased 
potential for collisions.14  Most recently, concern over this possibility has led 
senior Air Force officials to push for technology that would assist UAS platforms 
to “see and avoid” other aerial platforms in congested airspace.15   
                                            
14  The fly's a spy - Unmanned aircraft; Unmanned aircraft 99. 
15  Catherine MacRae Hockmuth, "UAVs--The Next Generation," Air Force Magazine 90.2 (2007) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1275724951&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
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Finally, one of the biggest drawbacks of using UAS systems is the 
limited endurance of these platforms compared to satellites and airships.  
Although this point may seem to counter the idea of the earlier comparison to 
aerial platforms, an unmanned aircraft will not sustain its mission endurance to 
comparative levels of geosynchronous orbiting assets.  Therefore, for 
communications missions and long-term reconnaissance, an unmanned aircraft 
will only last as long as its fuel capacity will sustain its flight.  Therefore, UAS 
might not be practical for these types of missions where limited gaps in coverage 
are a requirement for mission success.  Additionally, remaining in one place to 
serve as a communications relay negates one of the UAS’s biggest advantages – 
its maneuverability and flexibility.  In response to the limits to its on-station time, 
ongoing research is working to develop increased endurance potential for future 
UAS systems.  One area of research is the possibility of conducting aerial 
refueling for these systems, by automating their navigation and providing sensors 
to allow close approach and linkup.16  The use of this technique, however, would 
require the UAS platforms conducting linkup to have the ability to distinguish 
between background clutter and essential components such as refueling nozzles.  
A second area of research is in the possibility of using solar energy to provide 
unlimited power to extend UAS missions.  An example of this is the Helios solar 
powered UAV being developed by NASA.17  With a duration goal of sustained 
flight for up to four months each voyage, this technology would utilize direct 
sunlight radiation to maintain power during the day and employ the use of a 
hydrogen fuel cell to sustain itself overnight.18  By maintaining a level circling 
flight at 17-20 km altitude, the UAS would be virtually geostationary.  However,  
 
                                            
16  "Automating Aerial Refuelling for UAVs," Advanced Imaging 22.1 (2007) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1214516341&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
17  Air-Attack.com - Helios solar powered UAV, August 21, 2008 <http://www.air-
attack.com/page/17/Helios-solar-powered-UAV.html>. 
18  G. Romeo, G. Frulla, and E. Cestino, "Design of a high-altitude long-endurance solar-powered 
unmanned air vehicle for multi-payload and operations," Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers 221.G2 (2007) 
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1324754831&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>. 
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this technology has not yet been incorporated into the current inventory of DoD 
UAS platforms.  The argument of lack of endurance against UAS collection 
platforms, therefore, remains.  
3.  Systems Selected 
 
Figure 1.   U.S. Army Sky Warrior UAV (MQ-1C)19 
a. U.S. Army Sky Warrior 
The U.S. Army Sky Warrior Extended Range Multi-Purpose 
(ERMP) UAS is a new variant of the Predator UAS produced by General 
Atomics.  Procured as a replacement for the Hunter UAS, the Sky Warrior, 
designated the MQ-1C, has an increased wingspan (48.7 ft vs. 56 ft) and is 
powered by the Thielert Centurion Heavy Fuel Engine that runs on the same fuel 
as traditional aircraft and helicopters.  The new heavy fuel engine makes the 
logistics of supporting the system much simpler in addition to gaining better 
engine performance at higher altitudes.  Other upgrades include an automatic 
takeoff and landing system, and a tactical common data link.  The data links will 
enable communications between the Sky Warrior and the ground control stations 
as well as interoperability with other Army aviation platforms.20  Like the 
                                            
19  ERMP Extended-Range Multi-Purpose UAV,  August 4, 2008 <http://www.defense-
update.com/products/e/ermpUAV.htm>. 
20  United States. Government Accountability Office., Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Major Weapon Programs: Report to Congressional Committees ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2008) 158, WorldCat. http://worldcat.org. 
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Predator, the Sky Warrior carries multiple payloads and has wing hard points to 
carry external stores including expendable sensors and weapons.  Initially, the 
Sky Warrior will be equipped with a Multi-spectral Targeting System Electro-
optical payload for day and night observation, and a Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(SAR) with Ground Moving Target Indication (GMTI) capability to spot moving 
targets. Apart from ISR missions, the Sky Warrior will provide an airborne 
communications relay, providing radio relay for SINCGARS FM communications 
networks to support forward and isolated units located ahead of the main forces, 
out of line-of-sight or ground communications reach.  Once fielded, the Joint 
Tactical Radio System (JTRS) will be included in the system's standard 
equipment package and replace the current FM-only relay to enable the Sky 
Warrior to provide communications relay to EPLRS or SINCGARS networks. This 
service is critical to supporting blue force tracking – a service that monitors 
locations and status of friendly forces.21   Once the Warfighter Information 
Network – Tactical (WIN-T) battlefield network is fielded (currently estimated at 
around FY2014), the Sky Warrior will carry radios capable of relaying wide-band 
communications in support of this new system.22 
The Army plans on making the Sky-Warrior a division controlled 
asset as opposed to the Predator currently being a theater-controlled asset.  As 
such, the Army plans to purchase 12 Sky-Warrior systems (there are 10 active 
duty army divisions).  Each system comes with 12 aircraft, ground control 
stations, ground and air data terminals, automatic takeoff and landing systems, 
and ground support equipment.  According to a 2008 GAO report, total program 
cost will be $1.5367 billion with an average system cost being $128.055 million.23  
As a Land Component Commander controlled asset, and a highly capable UAS, 
the Sky-Warrior will be used as the representative medium-altitude UAS for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
                                            
21  Sky-Warrior ERMP UAV System, August 4, 2008 <http://www.defense-
update.com/products/w/warriorUAV.htm>. 
22  Frank Bayush, Telephone Interview of Frank Bayush, July 29, 2008 at 2:00 PM PST. 
23  United States. Government Accountability Office., 157. 
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b.  Global Hawk 
The U.S. Air Forces’ RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high-altitude long-
endurance UAS with integrated sensors and ground stations providing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.  The Global Hawk 
was designed from inception to provide Joint Force Commanders with high-
resolution, near-real-time sensor coverage of wide geographic areas. The Global 
Hawk, once programmed, can autonomously taxi, take-off, fly, remain on-station 
collecting ISR, return, and land.  Ground based operators need only to monitor 
the UAV health and status, and make any necessary changes to flight plans or 
sensor collections as the mission dictates.24  Six Global Hawks have been 
deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan since 2002 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom since 2003, accumulating over 4,300 combat flight 
hours.25  
The platform boasts an impressive array of sensors.  The Global 
Hawk has an EO/IR camera with 0.33 m resolution in spot mode collection.  It 
has a 1 m resolution SAR for wide-area search and large area imagery 
collection.  It also has a GMTI with a 4-knot minimum detection velocity.26  A new 
version of the Global Hawk (Global Hawk-B is still underdevelopment) will have 
improved versions of these sensors and a signals intelligence (SIGINT) payload. 
Like a satellite, the Global Hawk is controlled at or above the 
theater level, which sometimes makes it slow to respond to the fluid nature of the 
battlefield.  So, although its physical abilities would allow it to be highly 
responsive, the information lag between the tactical level and the 
operational/strategic level impacts its overall responsiveness.  Additionally, like 
                                            
24  Global Hawk RQ-4A-B, August 21, 2008 <http://www.defense-
update.com/products/g/globalhawk.htm>. 
25  RQ-4A/B Global Hawk High-Altitude, Long-Endurance, Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft Air 
Force Technology, August 22, 2008 <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/global/>. 




satellites, the reason for the control at this high level is the limited quantities of 
the platforms and the staggeringly high costs.  According to the GAO, as of 
September 2007 the Global Hawk program cost was $9.6 billion.  With only 54 
platforms on order (seven A models and 47 B models), this is a cost of $178 
million apiece.27  Despite these obstacles, the Global Hawk has been the most 
successful and well established high-altitude UAS.  For this reason, the Global 
Hawk is the representative high-altitude UAS. 
B.  HIGH-ALTITUDE LONG-ENDURANCE AIRSHIPS 
1. History 
Airships have a history dating back to the mid-1800s.  Germany 
developed long-range zeppelins and completed over 160 trans-Atlantic 
passenger-carrying flights until the Hindenburg, filled with flammable hydrogen, 
burned while mooring in Lakehurst Naval Air Station in Manchester Township, 
New Jersey, on May 6, 1937.  The U.S. Navy successfully operated patrol 
airships filled with helium for years before, during, and after World War II.  Since 
World War II, commercial organizations such as Goodyear have successfully 
flown blimps for sightseeing, sports coverage, advertising, and other uses. The 
improvements in airship structures and operational procedures have continued to 
progress through the last half-century.28  Their ability to hover over a point on the 
ground for long periods gives them many of the benefits of a geostationary 
satellite.  However, some technical details may need to be overcome shortly as 
the first prototype is constructed. 
2.  Current Capabilities 
HALE airships fill several critical shortages across the services.  The 
successful production of airships could greatly increase the theater 
                                            
27  United States. Government Accountability Office., 91. 
28  Lewis Jamison, Isaac Porche, and Geoffrey Sommer, High-Altitude Airships For The Future Force 
Army (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005) 3, WorldCat. http://worldcat.org. 
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communications and surveillance capabilities that will considerably improve force 
performance in the theater battlespace.  Airships can function as surrogate 
satellites.  In comparison to geosynchronous space-based communications 
assets, they offer the advantages of shorter transmission distances, resulting in 
increased link margins, for relaying ground-based communications.  These 
increased link margins result in less power need to transmit information from the 
ground lowering your probability of communication interception and detection.  
Additionally, HALE airships offer shorter ranges and much longer endurance for 
sensor surveillance of the battlefield and acquisition of ground targets.  In 
comparison to UAS’, the HALE airships offer a better platform for 
communications relays due to their longer endurance, larger footprint, and 
payload weight capacity.  For these reasons, in the next 10 years HALE airships 
will prove invaluable to combat operations in all theaters. 
Airships, unlike aircraft, generate lift from buoyancy instead of through 
aerodynamics.  Consequently, airships do not need to stay in motion to remain 
aloft. Therefore, they can loiter over a specific location on the ground as well as 
move to a new location when directed.  In addition, airships can carry large-
volume, heavy payloads. The payload mass and maximum flight altitude is 
proportional to the size of the airship (the HAA objective is 4000lbs vs. 1900lbs 
for the Global Hawk).29  These characteristics make airships ideal for multiple-
payload long-endurance missions.30  These High-Altitude Long-Endurance 
(HALE) airships, unmanned lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles, flying high above the 
jet-stream at 65,000-70,000 feet (approximately 20 km) in a quasi-geostationary 
position will shortly serve as a platform for persistent surveillance and as a 
communications relay.   From this altitude, airships will have a 325-mile line-of-
sight radius to the horizon and a relatively benign weather environment.31  Many 
                                            
29  RQ-4A/B Global Hawk High-Altitude, Long-Endurance, Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft Air 
Force Technology. 
30  Anthony Collozza and James L. Dolce, High-Altitude, Long-Endurance Airships for Coastal 
Surveillance Glenn Research Center, February 2005), NASA Technical Reports Server August 4, 2008. 
31  SMDC Technical Center, HALL High Altitude Long Loiter Efforts, 2006), . 
http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/HALL.pdf. August 4, 2008. 
 21
of the critical technologies such as high-strength fabrics to minimize hull weight, 
thin-film solar arrays for regenerative power supply, and light-weight propulsion 
units have matured to the point where the ability to build and operate a prototype 
HALE airship is now a reality.   
An example of an airship currently under development is the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Integrated Sensor Is the 
Structure (ISIS) program.  This HALE program integrates a powerful radar into 
the structure of the airship.  Hovering 70,000 feet above ground, the ISIS would 
use a giant, flexible radar antenna to give, in the words of DARPA program 
manager Larry Correy, a "dynamic, detailed, real-time picture of all movement on 
or above the battlefield: friendly, neutral or enemy."32  "We will apply this 
technology to track people emerging from buildings of interest and follow them as 
they move to new locations," said DARPA's Paul Benda.  "Imagine the impact it 
will have if ISIS tracks the movement of individuals for months.  Hidden webs of 
connections between people and facilities will be revealed."33  ISIS would be 
CONUS based and deploy to an operational theater for up to a year.  ISIS will 
use a large aperture size instead of high power to meet radar performance 
requirements.  This approach exploits the platform's size and conforms to the 
platform's limitations on weight and power.  Major technical challenges are the 
development of ultra-lightweight antennas, antenna calibration technologies, 
power systems, station keeping approaches, and airships that support extremely 
large antennas.34  With the problems experience by the Space Radar program, 
ISIS would provide Space Radar-like theater level capability for much less. 
The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/U.S. Army Forces 
Strategic Command (SMDC/ARSTRAT) has taken the lead in managing the 
HiSentinel program.  On November 8, 2005, a team led by Southwest Research 
                                            
32  Darpa's Far-Out Dreams on Display, March 15, 2004, Wired, August 5, 2008 
<http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/03/62646>. 
33  Shachtman. 
34  Integrated Sensor Is Structure (ISIS), DARPA Microsystems Technology Office, August 5, 2008 
<http://www.darpa.mil/mto/programs/isis/index.html>. 
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Institute (SwRI) successfully demonstrated powered flight of the HiSentinel 
stratospheric airship at an altitude of 74,000 feet.  The development team of 
Aerostar International, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), and SwRI 
launched the airship from Roswell, N.M., for a five-hour technology 
demonstration flight.  The 146-foot-long (44.5 m) airship carried a 60-pound (27 
kg) equipment pod and propulsion system when it became only the second 
airship in history to achieve powered flight in the stratosphere.35  Designed for 
launch from remote sites, these airships do not require large hangars or special 
facilities.  The objective HiSentinel will be capable of 200lb/1000W payload at 
67,000 feet for 30 days.36  Unlike most stratospheric airship concepts, HiSentinel 
is launched flaccid with the hull only partially inflated with helium.  As the airship 
rises, the helium expands until it completely inflates the hull to the rigid 
aerodynamic shape required for operation.   
a.  Advantages 
HALE airships are an ideal platform for persistent ground 
surveillance and communications relays.  However, there are a number of other 
potential missions suggested for HALE airships.  These include: broadcast 
communications, missile warning, airspace surveillance and control, maritime 
surveillance and control, aerial and ground reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
target acquisition (RSTA), fires coordination, position/navigation, weather 
monitoring, battlespace environmental monitoring, electronic countermeasures, 
air defense (AD)/cruise missile defense (CMD)/tactical missile defense (TMD) 
weapons platform, and air-to-ground weapons platform.37 
Airships can function as surrogate satellites and offers the 
advantage of ranges shorter than those of satellite sensors for surveillance of the 
battlefield and acquisition of ground targets and shorter transmission distances 
                                            
35  Raven Industries Announces Five-Hour Flight Of 'HiSentinel' Powered Stratospheric Airship, August 
4, 2008 <http://www.spacedaily.com/news/uav-05zzzzzr.html>. 
36  SMDC Technical Center. 
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for relaying ground-based communications.  The persistent surveillance from a 
fixed position by airships, in contrast to periodic snapshots from the moving 
platforms that satellites provide, furnishes two long-needed changes to military 
surveillance.  These changes will allow continuous collection and comparison 
analysis over time of terrain covered by different sensors, such as infrared (IR), 
electro-optical (EO), and hyper-spectral imagery (HSI).  Comparisons can 
highlight physical changes like freshly turned dirt along a roadway where 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been emplaced or new buildings in a 
desolate and unpopulated area that may indicate the construction of a new 
terrorist training camp.38  Additionally, with a 325-mile line-of-sight radius, one 
airship can potentially be used for surveillance over an area the size of 
Afghanistan (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.   Ground coverage area of a HALE Airship at 65,000 ft 39 
                                            
37  Jamison, Porche, and Sommer, 15. 
38  Jamison, Porche, and Sommer, 15. 
39  Jamison, Porche, and Sommer, 19. 
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Across the services, there is an increasing demand for overhead 
communications capacity.  However, the exclusive use of military or commercial 
SATCOM will not be available to meet all of the services connectivity needs, and 
HALE airships are being considered as an optional surrogate, which will be much 
more cost-effective once proved technically feasible.40 
In the U.S. Army, the demand is being driven because of its 
transition to WIN-T and the Future Combat System (FCS).  Future forces will be 
more dispersed so extending the range of their communications will be crucial 
and will be very difficult via traditional line of sight methods.  Currently, satellite 
communications (SATCOM) are being relied upon to connect these dispersed 
units.  The objective is to integrate both airships and satellites into a multilayered 
network of terrestrial-, air-, and space-based retransmission nodes.   
b.  Disadvantages 
Disadvantages of HALE airships include areas of technical and 
operational risk, highlighted in Table 1 below. 
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There is a close association between technical risk and operational 
utility.  Recently, a great deal of progress has been made in overcoming some of 
the technical risks and additional risk could be managed by operational 
restrictions.  This may include restricting the ascent and decent of the airship in 
adverse weather conditions.  However, there will always be those risks that are 
unpredictable and that can result in catastrophic and unexpected system failure. 
These risks stem from the nature of the environment in which the vehicle 
operates — the effects of weather and, particularly (in the case of an airship), 
wind.42 
Airships, as with UAS’s, will be vulnerable to advanced enemy air 
defenses.  However, due to the airships’ high-altitude, stationary position, and 
low radar and thermal cross sections only the most advanced air defense 
platforms will be able to detect and target them.  Notwithstanding these 
characteristics, which make engagement by hostile air defenses more difficult, air 
dominance will be a requirement for full airship operations to be achieved over 
the battlefield.   
3.  System Selected 
The High Altitude Airship (HAA), originally initiated by the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) as a cruise missile detection platform, is now managed by 
SMDC/ARSTRAT.  Like the ISIS, the HAA will self-deploy from CONUS to a 
theater of operations and remain on-station for up to one year with the ability to 
station keep.  The prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, is currently in the 
contract's third phase.  The third phase of the Advanced Concept and 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program is a prototype build and flight 
demonstration.  In this phase of the program, Lockheed Martin will build and fly a 
HAA prototype vehicle by the summer of 2009 in order to demonstrate launch 
and recovery, station keeping, and autonomous flight control characteristics and 
capabilities.  Its utility as a mobile, retaskable, high-altitude, geostationary, long-
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endurance platform will span from short and long-range missile warning, 
surveillance and target acquisition to communications relay and 
weather/environmental monitoring.  The capabilities of the HAA are expected to 
be a 4,000lb/15kW (1814 kg) payload weight and power maintained at an altitude 
of 70,000 feet for up to one year.43  All of the payload will be carried in a 
pressurized, climate controlled payload bay on the bottom of the HAA.  The 
controlled environment should enable the easy transition of sensors originally 
developed for high altitude UAS, such as the Global Hawk, to be migrated to the 
HAA platform.  The Raytheon Global Hawk Integrated Sensor Suite and Ground 
System would make the most sense because the sensors are already optimized 
for the altitude for which the HAA will be flying.  In addition, the sensors are 
platform independent so integrating them into the HAA should not be an issue.  
The suite includes the transmitter, receiver, integrated sensor processor, sensor 
electronics unit, SAR antenna, and EO/IR sensor.  The sensor has a 0.33 m 
resolution in spot mode and a 1 m resolution in wide-area search mode. The MTI 
mode for vehicle velocity and geolocation has a 4-knot minimum detectable 
velocity.  The ground segment can control up to three HAA at once.44  
Additionally, new Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) sensors should be able to 
quickly migrate to a HAA platform because they do not need to be ruggedized for 
the frequent jolts the equipment would receive on landings made by UAVs.  
Figure 3 below shows an artist rendition of the HAA and fulfilling some of its 
potential missions. 
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Figure 3.   Lockheed Martin HAA45 
For the purposes of this thesis, the HAA will be used as the representative 
HALE system because of its advanced state of design and predicted capabilities. 
C. SMALL SATELLITES 
1. History 
With a diameter of 23 inches and a weight of 183 lbs, Sputnik 1 was the 
world’s first SmallSat.46  The United States followed that launch with a SmallSat 
of its own, Explorer I, a 30 lb satellite to measure the radiation belts around the 
earth.47  These successful missions, and those that soon followed them, were 
SmallSats by necessity rather than choice.  Their weight and size were small due 
to concerns about thrust and rocket capabilities.  As satellites have evolved, they 
                                            
45  High Altitude Airship (HAATM) Global Persistence for the Joint Warfighter, March 2, 2006, 
Lockheed Martin, August 4, 2008 <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/7966.pdf>. 
46  "The Sputnik," TIME October 14, 1957: August 5, 2008 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,862778-1,00.html>. 
47  Explorer Information, August 5, 2008 <http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/expinfo.html>. 
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have become more capable, larger and much heavier.  The generally accepted 
definition of a SmallSat is one that weighs less than 1,000 lbs.48  Most current 
generation military satellites fall into the large satellite category (over 2,000 kg).  
For example, Defense Support Program (DSP) missile warning satellites are over 
5,000 lbs49 while the newest communications satellite on orbit, WGS, is over 
7,500 lbs.50  
2. Current Capabilities 
The large size of most current DoD satellites is critical to long mission life 
and assurance of complex capabilities.  Large solar cell areas and numerous 
batteries are needed to provide power to the satellite throughout its orbit and 
lifetime.  Large buses are necessary to support the large optics of imagery 
satellites and large antenna of communications satellites.  The complicated 
payloads and high-power antennas needed to convey data, however, come at 
the cost of long development time and high price.  For example, here is a list of 
recent large satellite space programs and a measure of their development time 
from full funding to launch: 
• WGS – 7 years – Nov 00 to Oct 07 51 
• AEHF – 7 years – Sep 01 to Nov 08 (projected) 52 
• TSAT – 11+ years – Jan 04 to Sep 15 (projected) 53 
• MUOS – 6 years – Sep 04 to Mar 10 (projected) 54 
                                            
48  Small Satellites Home Page - Satellite classification, Surrey Satellite Technology Limited, August 5, 
2008 <http://centaur.sstl.co.uk/SSHP/sshp_classify.html>. 
49  Factsheets : Defense Support Program Satellites : Defense Support Program Satellites, , August 5, 
2008 <http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=96>. 
50  Fact Sheets : Wideband Global SATCOM Satellite : Wideband Global SATCOM Satellite, August 5, 
2008 <http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5582>. 
51  United States. Government Accountability Office., 173. 
52  United States. Government Accountability Office., 39. 
53  Fact Sheets : Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) : Transformational 
Satellite Communications System (TSAT), , 8/22/2008 2008 
<http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5332>. 
54  United States. Government Accountability Office., 143. 
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• SBIRS – 14+ years – Feb 95 to Nov 09 (projected) 55  
• GPS III – 7 years – Dec 07 to FY14 (projected) 56 
SmallSats, on the other hand, individually cost less and take less time to 
develop and launch.  However, they also bring fewer capabilities to orbit.  Power 
generation is a life-limiting factor and means the satellite can only support less 
complex payloads.  Limited power makes hosting large imaging systems and 
high bandwidth communications systems on small satellites currently untenable.   
a. Advantages 
The generally less complex SmallSats are easier, cheaper, and 
faster to build and launch.  Additionally, more frequent production of these 
smaller satellites will result in significant cost savings through economies of 
scale.  Costs are spread out over many more units rather than having to bear the 
expense of maintaining a “standing army” of experts to maintain production 
capability for fewer larger units.57  By building a larger number of small satellites 
instead of building only a few large satellites each year, the satellite industry will 
benefit.  For the last several years, there have been concerns about the future of 
the military space industry due to the lack of competition and the lack of enough 
large contracts to “go around.”  A greater requirement for small satellites will 
encourage new players to emerge in the industry and keep skills and expertise 
sharp.  This leads to Learning Curve savings and more proficient and efficient 
producers.58   
So, the argument can certainly be made that the advantages of 
SmallSats are attractive.  However, their small size limits their mission set.   Their 
                                            
55  United States. Government Accountability Office., 153. 
56  GPS III / GPS Block III, , 8/22/2008 2008 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/gps_3.htm>. 
57  Les Doggrell, "Operationally Responsive Space: A Vision for the Future of Military Space," Air and 
Space Power Journal June 1, 2006: August 5, 2008 
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/doggrell.html>. 
58  The Space Review: From one, many, August 20, 2007, The Space Review, August 5, 2008 
<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/937/1>. 
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small size can also be an advantage for some missions.  For example, ANGELS 
(Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space) satellites are 
very small satellites (around 40 lbs) that will orbit around a larger host satellite 
and monitor the space environment around it.59  These satellites are being 
developed by the Air Force Research Lab and a $30M contract was awarded to 
Orbital Sciences Corp in Nov 2007 to provide support.60  These satellites will be 
able to provide the DoD with better Situational Awareness of their 
geosynchronous on-orbit satellites.  They can monitor the satellites themselves 
for any obvious outward anomalies or can monitor the area around these 
satellites for debris or other natural or man-made threats.  ANGELS is similar to a 
2005 Air Force XSS-11 satellite that successfully maneuvered around and 
monitored satellites in LEO orbit.61   
Orbital Express is a DARPA-developed program whose SmallSats 
are designed to “validate the technical feasibility of robotic, autonomous on-orbit 
refueling and reconfiguration of satellites to support a broad range of future U.S. 
national security and commercial space programs.”62   The potential of these 
satellites is enormous.  They could potentially reduce or eliminate the life-
reducing issues that face our satellites today.  Most satellites run out of fuel (thus 
rendering attitude control useless) or have the batteries die off (there is a limit to 
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Laboratory, November 14, 2007, Orbital, August 5, 2008 
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Scientist Space," New Scientist August 4, 2006: August 5, 2008 
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but still operational, satellite or replace batteries and extend its lifetime.  In March 
2007, Orbital Express was launched and successfully demonstrated these 
capabilities.63   
The ANGELS and Orbital Express programs are excellent 
examples of how SmallSats can provide capability and fill gaps in our defense.  
They can reduce our vulnerabilities in space to active adversaries as well as 
natural degradation and anomalies.  All have demonstrated technology with 
actual funding and contracts in place; it is obvious that this approach is being 
taken seriously.   
There is clear military applicability to using SmallSats in the role of 
Space Situational Awareness and other satellite support and servicing as 
demonstrated by ANGELS and Orbital Express.  Additionally, there is the 
potential that SmallSats could be used to complement and supplement the 
existing larger systems.  Rather than replace DSP/SBIRS, a SmallSat could sit 
right next to it with a smaller focal plane array constantly staring at one specific 
volatile region.  Alternatively, three SmallSats close together in the GEO belt 
could add more precision to the GPS constellation over a specific Area of 
Responsibility (similar to the Chinese navigation system).  On the other hand, a 
SmallSat could provide low data rate communications coverage to a small 
sparsely used geographical area.  In all of these examples, the SmallSat is not 
as capable as the larger constellation currently in place, but they could be used 
to enhance the effects and support that these systems provide.   
Future applications, such as the DARPA F6 fractionated satellite 
program, include development of a constellation of small satellites to potentially 
act together as a single larger satellite.  This could be accomplished by each 
SmallSat acting as, and having the functionality of, a larger satellite’s subsystem 
and acting in concert to complete the mission.  Such a SmallSat constellation 
would be easier to sustain and upgrade by having only to replace a single 
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SmallSat in the event of a failure.  This is in contrast to replacing an entire large 
satellite just because of the failure of a single subsystem.64  The military utility of 
such a constellation is still being analyzed.   
SmallSats can also be used as a technology demonstrator.  Labs 
and simulations are limited as to how well they can test the environmental 
conditions of space.  Often times, a new technology’s first trip to orbit is as an 
integral part of a multi-hundred-million-dollar satellite.  Instead, SmallSats could 
be launched to demonstrate or develop a new technology.  SmallSats could test 
new solar cells, thrusters, batteries, sensors, antennas, momentum systems or 
any number of other subsystems and payloads.  “Space flown” technology is 
much more attractive to the acquirer of military space systems.  
With “space tests” in mind, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s, 
Office of Force Transformation (OFT), began the Operationally Responsive 
Space (ORS) experimentation program in May 2003.  TacSat experiments are 
jointly selected using an iterative process involving the Combatant Commanders 
and Services.  Since the closure of the OFT, the ORS Office has taken the lead 
in the TacSat program.  Today, there are four TacSats in various stages of 
completion.  TacSat-1 was completed and ready to launch on a new Falcon-1 
launch vehicle from Kwajalein Atoll.65  However, with the failure of a Falcon-1 
launch in March 2006, the flight was postponed and later cancelled.  The flight 
was cancelled because TacSat-2 demonstrated many of the capabilities that 
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The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has since decided to upgrade the payload 
in an effort to earn a manifest on a future launch once the Falcon-1 has proved it 
is a reliable launch vehicle.66   
 
Figure 4.   TacSat-2 67 
TacSat-2 (see Figure 4), primarily sponsored by the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL), was an extension of the Roadrunner experiment.  
A spiral development process was used in the design and build of the spacecraft 
at a cost of $39 million.68  A number of experimental payload were carried into 
orbit on December 16, 2006, aboard a Minotaur I launch vehicle.  Some of the 
experiments included a tactical imagery payload with approximately 1m 
resolution, a RF SIGINT payload, a tactical Common Data Link and UHF 
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payloads, and a number of smaller scientific payloads.69  After one-year of 
successful operation, TacSat-2 ceased operations on December 21, 2007.70 
TacSat-3 was the first mission selected by the joint community.  
Jointly funded by AFRL and the Army, the main payload is a hyperspectral and 
panchromatic imager.  The Navy is also supplying a small data-exfiltration 
payload.71  Like TacSat-2, TacSat-3 is currently scheduled to launch in October 
2008, aboard a Minotaur-I launch vehicle from the Mid-Atlantic Regional 
Spaceport at Wallops Island, Virginia.  The satellite cost is estimated to be $62.7 
million.72 
 
Figure 5.   TacSat-4 CONOPS 73 
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The TacSat-4 mission, also selected by the joint community, is the 
first TacSat to attempt to demonstrate long-dwell capability (two+ hours per pass 
with about three passes per day) by using a highly elliptical orbit (see Figure 5).  
With this type of orbit, the satellite footprint will be approximately 2000 nautical 
miles (3700 km).  The main payloads for the TacSat-4 spacecraft include 
comms-on-the-move, blue force tracking, and data exfiltration.  The comms-on-
the-move package supports legacy UHF users and will provide a ‘MUOS-like’ 
wideband data capability by providing tens of users data rates up to 64 kbps and 
possibly 256 kbps.  The blue force tracking is focused on providing better service 
to underserved areas.  Finally, the data exfiltration is a capability the Navy wants 
to exercise to retrieve data from buoys at sea.  TacSat-4 is also a test bed for the 
satellite bus standardization that will be needed to make it possible to mass-
produced TacSats in the future if necessary.  TacSat-4 will need to be launched 
from a larger rocket, in this case a Minotaur IV, to get it into its highly elliptical 
orbit.  The estimated final satellite cost is $114 million.74 
b.  Disadvantages 
Despite all the advantages of small satellites, they have some 
serious disadvantages as well.  Once in orbit it is difficult to place it into a new 
orbit.  To changes orbits it takes a lot of fuel and satellites can only carry so 
much fuel with them into orbit.  Once the fuel runs out, then the satellite is stuck 
and its orbit will decay until it falls back to Earth (assuming a small satellite in 
LEO or HEO).  Solving this problem, with future spacecraft recently 
demonstrated by Orbital Express, would represent a paradigm shift in how 
spacecraft are operated.  Satellites would be able to optimize their orbit for a new 
target area or move from a HEO to a LEO and back again.  None of this is 
currently possible. 
Another disadvantage is the inflexibility of the spacecraft.  Once the 
spacecraft is launched, the payload cannot be changed.  So, if the payload 
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malfunctions or becomes outdated, then the satellite, and your investment in it, 
becomes useless.  The software in most satellites now can be updated, but the 
hardware is fixed and will deteriorate over time due to the harsh conditions in 
space.   
When continuous, frequent contact is needed with the satellite 
system you are using, then it is also necessary to establish ground stations 
scattered across the world to maintain this communications link.  Satellites 
transmit data to Earth with a line-of-sight radio frequency link.  Therefore, if you 
do not have a station that can see the satellite then you cannot receive 
information from it.  Large stations like this are expensive and represent an 
infrastructure cost necessary to maintain a constellation of satellites.  One of the 
features of a tactical satellite is the desire to contact the end-user directly without 
this burden.  Additionally, if you are lacking ground stations, then the cost of the 
satellite goes up because it must store the data it collects until it does pass over 
a ground station to download it. 
Finally, another disadvantage of imaging satellites is their limited 
persistence over and revisit of targeted areas of interest.  Although satellites 
have a large footprint, they do not have much time to take pictures of objects that 
they can see because they are traveling so fast in orbit.  Additionally, to get the 
resolution desired by today’s users, the area they can image usually gets 
smaller.  If the resolution and the area imaged both increase, then the size of the 
data file becomes unmanageable and difficult to transmit back to the user. 
3. Systems Selected 
TacSat-2 was launched in December 2006 aboard a Minotuar-1 launch 
vehicle with NASA’s GeneSat-1.  It contained 11 experiments including an Earth 
Surface Imager (ESI) and SIGINT payload.  The objective of the ESI was to 
obtain high-resolution imagery at less than 1 m Ground Sample Distance (GSD).  
For the purposes of this thesis, TacSat-2 will be the representative ISR SmallSat 
because of its successful IMINT and SIGINT mission.  TacSat-4 is a satellite that 
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is scheduled for launch in 2009.  Its mission is to provide UHF communications 
on the move capabilities similar to the future Mobile User Objective System 
(MUOS) constellation.75  In addition, it will supplement blue force tracking 
capabilities in underserved locations.  For the purposes of this thesis, TacSat-4 
will be the representative communications SmallSat. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
[Current] trends point to shifts in the character and forms of future 
warfare.  Many states will improve their conventional capabilities, 
and states and non-state actors alike will be able to acquire lethal 
capabilities. A significant trend is the blurring of what was 
previously thought to be distinct forms of war or conflict — 
conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and criminality — 
into what can be described as hybrid challenges.76 
A. PURPOSE AND FOCUS 
The purpose of the DoD’s expenditure on airborne and orbiting ISR and 
communications platforms is well understood: the increased requirements for the 
warfighter to maintain continuous communications over vast distances, and the 
increased reliance on ISR products for operational planning.  Deciding which 
platform (or mix of platforms) the DoD should invest in is a complex matter.  The 
future is difficult to predict.  How do we quantify the utility of these platforms 
under different future scenarios?  The answer to this question is not easy to 
come by, but there is value in attempting to measure the effectiveness of these 
systems.  By identifying cost-effective alternatives to provide to the end-user, 
given anticipated world events, we arm decision makers with the knowledge to 
invest in the right system(s).  Many organizations recognize the need to address 
this growing demand to ensure our future capability (Figure 6).   
                                            





Figure 6.   Space Modernization Strategy77 
 
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is both the current DoD operational 
focus and is the most likely scenario for many years to come, and so was of 
primary consideration for our analysis.78  This operational environment espouses 
a low-tech, unpredictable enemy that is often difficult to target.  The real measure 
of how our analysis may prove beneficial is in how well it may help us to 
adequately invest in and deploy the optimal vehicle (or combination of vehicles) 
to identify, detect, or predict our enemy’s next move, leading to our ability to 
conduct accurate target identification and targeting.  In this type of operational 
environment successes are often difficult to ascertain and silent victories are 
more common.  Enemy intentions may be thwarted or avoided, but to what extent 
may not always be known or quantifiable.79  Concurrently, the DoD must 
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maintain the ability to conduct conventional military operations with peer or near-
peer adversaries.  To lose sight of this possibility could prove disastrous.  To 
support either of these possibilities, decision makers must invest in technology 
that provides the warfighter with the most capability in every operational 
scenario.  With a limited budget, he must decide if he will spend money on UAVs, 
HAAs, or TACSATs, or in some ideal combination thereof. 
B. ANALYSIS TYPE 
As stated earlier, a comparison of these four platforms is possible as long 
as the analysis is in areas they all have in common.  For this reason, we chose 
two primary areas for comparison: electro-optical remote sensing and 
communications.  As shown in Figure 6, ISR and communications are key 
components of our future space strategy for meeting warfighter needs.  All three 
platforms in this study possess the ability to provide an enhanced capability to 
collect optical intelligence and to provide long-range communications to improve 
the operational capability and reach of the warfighter.  Our initial inclination for 
this comparison was to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  A CBA identifies 
all the gains and losses from a proposal and converts them into monetary units 
for comparison.  According to Stokey, a CBA is a five-step process: 
1. Identify projects to analyze. 
2. Identify all present a future impacts (both favorable and 
unfavorable). 
3. Assign values (usually dollars) to these impacts.  Register favorable 
impacts as benefits, unfavorable ones as costs. 
4. Calculate net benefit. 
5. Make choice.  
However, as the author goes on to explain, the “elements of benefit-cost 
analysis are [used to] determine whether a project … should be undertaken.”80  
The particular systems involved in our study are, and will continue to be, market 
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areas in which the DoD already has investment and interest.  Therefore, a CBA 
of these systems is not the preferred analysis tool for comparison.   
Nevertheless, it was necessary to continue to search for a way to evaluate 
the degree of government investment needed in these programs to determine the 
correct combination for maximum effectiveness.  The analysis tool that assists 
with this situation is the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).  A CEA still measures 
costs and benefits, but eliminates the need to use a common metric to measure 
them.  According to Stokey, “a cost effectiveness analysis is applicable when (a) 
costs of alternative projects are identical [and] benefits need to be compared … 
or (b) when benefits are identical and … costs need to be compared.”81  
Therefore, a CEA is the applicable analysis tool for our study.   
C. ANALYSIS APPROACH 
There are numerous directive publications and guidelines within the DoD 
to assist program managers in ways to determine the best alternative for 
identified mission needs.  All of them, in some way, center on the idea that 
program managers must conduct a “…structured process for [evaluating] the 
most efficient and cost-effective method of performance for commercial 
activities…”82  Based on available information, program managers must decide 
where the best alternative investment lies between competing programs.   
Numerous methods exist to assist in making these decisions, but all 
methods focus on certain core foundational truths of objective analysis, as shown 
in Figure 7.   
                                            
81  Stokey and Zeckhauser, 154. 
82  Whitehouse Office of Management and Budget. 
 43
 
Figure 7.   Pillars of the Decision Making Process.83  
To ensure the best possible decision, program managers are required to 
conduct an objective analysis that determines which investment achieves the 
required mission performance with regard to design, cost, risk, and schedule.  
Decision makers have two primary approaches to choose from to answer the 
problem:  the decision science approach and the economics approach.  Both 
approaches use similar tools (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness 
analysis, etc.) to assist decision makers.  However, they differ in their view of the 
various alternatives.  The decision science approach focuses on an analysis of 
alternatives (AoA) while the economics approach focuses on an evaluation of 
alternatives (EoA).   
1. Decision Science Approach 
An AoA is “…an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, 
suitability, and life-cycle cost of alternatives that satisfy established capability 
needs.”84  The intent is to be quantitative, comprehensive, and objective, and to 
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examine multiple aspects of a program’s alternatives with a focus on determining 
the best alternative based on the understanding of technical risk, maturity, cost 
and price.  Through the process of conducting the AoA, decision-makers 
establish better program understanding and insight into the facts surrounding the 
program and answers to some of the assumptions.  In summation, the analysis 
must outline the relative advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives 
considered within the AoA.85  The result of this analysis is intended to answer the 
question: “Given the alternatives, which one maximizes the best value?” 
2. Economics Approach 
An EoA provides an economical approach to decision making.  The 
objective is to select the alternative that maximizes utility to the end-user with 
respect to an evaluation of varying budget restraints.  Both techniques attempt to 
objectively evaluate alternatives, and both techniques use cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) to conduct this evaluation.  The primary differences between the 
two methods (AoA vs. EoA) are: a) where, in the process of the analysis, the 
CEA takes place; and b) the variables used in the analysis.  In the AoA, “… the 
last analytical section of the AoA plan deals with the planned approach for the 
cost-effectiveness comparisons of the study alternatives.”86  By contrast, this is 
typically the first step in the EoA.  The AoA approach typically measures 
effectiveness against cost, while the EoA approach measures both effectiveness 
and cost variables but applies an estimated budget to determine the impact on 
the CEA.  This allows the decision maker to ask the question: “Could an 
incremental increase (or decrease) in budget result in a marked improvement (or 
degradation) in effectiveness?”  The question becomes particularly important 
once real budget constraints are applied to the problem.   A study of this nature 
can allow the decision maker to make the best investment decision in the event 
                                            
85  Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs, June 10, 2001, Office of The Undersecretary of Defense, 
September 10, 2008 <http://www.mitre.org/work/sepo/toolkits/risk/references/files/DoD5000.2R_Jun01.pdf>. 
86  Defense Acquisition Guidebook Sect 3.3. 
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of budget shortages (which can be quite common) or increases to determine their 
impact on overall capability.  For the purposes of our study, we chose the 
economics approach.  This approach allowed us to examine budget changes on 
the degree of mission capability that each of our alternatives could provide. 
D. ANALYSIS PROCESS 
To assist our analysis, we followed a process commonly used by DoD and 
commercial systems engineering companies and depicted in Figure 8. This 
analysis process assisted us in our evaluation of the alternatives for investment 
in ISR and communications platforms. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Systems Engineering Analysis Process87 
Previous discussion covered the first three steps of the process in detail.  
To reiterate, we identified 1) the increasing requirement within the DoD for 
persistent ISR and communications coverage; 2) the shortfall in investment in 
platforms to meet operational user needs; and 3) the need for an analysis to 
                                            
87  Rice, 5. 
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determine the best solution to meet this shortfall.  Although a good model for 
mapping out our analysis, the model does not flow perfectly for our study.  In our 
study, since the alternative platforms are decided, the selection of alternative 
combinations will take place after the development of database results.  
Subsequent sections discuss the outcomes of the process steps. 
E.  DETERMINING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
1. MOE Attributes 
There is no universally accepted answer to define an MOE.  According to 
established policy that regulates government acquisitions, an MOE “lists the 
performance capabilities identified as required in the ORD (operational 
requirements documents)”.88 (The ORD has since been replaced by the 
Capabilities Development Document.)89  In other words, an MOE defines what 
the acquisition needs to be capable of doing to meet user needs.   Noel Sproles 
attempts to expound on this understanding by explaining, “[these] standards are 
specific properties which any potential solution must exhibit to some extent.”90  
They are further described as “showstoppers” that are usually small in 
number.  They are defined by the person(s) in the preeminent position to 
determine needs and the ability of alternatives to meet those needs (i.e., 
“stakeholders”), which is a key aspect of their formulation.  
When selecting MOEs for our evaluation, we searched through numerous 
documents to find measures that all three systems had in common.  Keeping in 
mind that an MOE “defines what is wanted rather than what must be done,” our 
selection focused on those measures where we could find, to the greatest degree 
                                            
88  Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs 127. 
89  Joint Staff / J-8 Capabilities and Acquisition Division, JCIDS Overview (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 2005), September 10, 2008 
<http://www.dau.mil/performance_support/docs/Nov_2005_JCIDS_Overview.ppt>. 
90  Noel Sproles, "Coming to Grips with Measures of Effectiveness," System Engineering: The Journal 
of the International Council on Systems Engineering 3.1 (2001) Topedo Ultra July 30, 2008 
<http://torpedo.nrl.navy.mil/tu/ps/doc.html?dsn=3129308>. 
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possible, quantitative objectivity (although measures with qualitative subjectivity 
were not eliminated).  As defined, we feel the MOEs chosen for the study 
represent those MOEs “whose qualities were sufficient to determine if a given 
system meets the stakeholder’s requirement.”91     
The first step is identifying the stakeholders.  The analysis considered a 
wide audience.  Recent wargames such as Schriever IV used HALE airships to 
support Northern Command and DHS for border security.92  NASA has used 
small satellites for various scientific experiments.  However, the thesis scope 
states that the analysis should be from the view of the ground forces commander 
therefore, he is the primary stakeholder with other stakeholders considered 
secondary.  With a combined 28 months command time in Iraq the authors have 
a good grasp of what is important to the ground forces commander.   
Next, in order to maintain a level playing field, any MOE that obviously 
applied only to one platform more than to the others, and would therefore give it 
a significant advantage, was not considered.  Each platform may perform 
exceptionally well in a niche area, but the goal is to find an overall best choice.  
Additionally, MOEs that focused solely upon specific sensors were not 
considered.  Sensor technology advances so quickly and the field of sensors are 
so large that it was decided to maintain focus on the platforms, which will be 
around for decades, instead of on sensors which will continue to change 
frequently.  However, some MOE’s will depend partially on a sensor type, and in 
instances such as this, a generic sensor with known capabilities was used for the 
required sensor characteristics. 
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Last, MOEs that could be evaluated with quantitative measures were used 
for comparison to the qualitative analysis, in order to validate qualitative analysis.  
In instances where quantitative analysis was not possible, fairness in evaluating 
the MOE was paramount. 
2. Chosen MOEs/Definitions 
Our MOE model represents the chosen measures for the alternatives to 
meet ISR and communications needs.  The following definitions bound the scope 
of how each MOE was assessed and then used in the study. 
a. Responsiveness 
The ability to react to new missions in a different geographical area 
and begin passing the user actionable data.  Additionally, it is the ability to 
replace the asset if lost. 
b. Access 
The geographic extent of what the payload can see over time – i.e. 
no time limit; for example, a single satellite in polar orbit has a global access 
area. 
c. Coverage 
An indication of how quickly the system can view an appropriate 
area of interest measured in km2/hour. 
d. Endurance 




The ability to use the same asset to perform more than one mission 
simultaneously and its ability to be configured for different missions. 
3. An Explanation of the Selected MOEs 
Many MOEs measure multiple capabilities.  One such MOE in this case is 
Responsiveness.  Responsiveness, as defined above, measures not only the 
ability to react to new missions, it also is the ability to reconstitute a lost asset if 
required.  If a platform cannot quickly respond to conditions or opportunities on a 
fluid battlefield then its operational use diminishes greatly.  Targets of opportunity 
are often fleeting and the platform you are using for surveillance must react 
quickly to track the target until the decision is made to conduct additional tracking 
for intelligence purpose or to make a kinetic strike.  If a platform is not capable of 
responsiveness, then it is probably better suited for strategic missions that do not 
call for sudden changes due to the fluidity of conflict.  The assumption for this 
MOE is that ground capabilities and processes exist for expeditious movement of 
the data from the ground station to the user who requested the capability or 
product.  Responsiveness is measured in hours. 
Access and coverage are similar, but their distinct differences lend each 
attribute to be a separate MOE.  Access is the ability of a platform to see or move 
over a piece of territory, measured in km2.  Access takes into account threats to 
the operation of the platform – for example, an airborne platform does not have 
access to an area protected by an air defense system.  Coverage is the ability to 
exploit the area you do have access to, measured in km2/hour.  This is a critical 
difference.  A satellite in polar low Earth orbit has global access whereas UAS 
and airships do not.  This means that a satellite can peer into denied territory in 
peacetime or before the achievement of air superiority in times of conflict.  
Additionally, during peacetime, airships, with their high altitude, can see a 
considerable distance into unfriendly countries by parking inside the borders of a 
friendly neighbor or by loitering in international waters off their coast.  Once 
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access over an area is gained, coverage is the ability to exploit the access area 
available to you at that time by conducting ISR or communications.  The ability to 
achieve coverage is a function of both the platform and the payload.  Payload 
coverage is what you are after but coverage cannot occur unless you have 
access.  The type of platform you choose will determine if you have access to the 
area you want to look at or if you can talk to the forces you have hidden there. 
Therefore, when trying to determine what the best platform is for persistent ISR 
and communications, access and coverage are both critical MOEs. 
Endurance is the ability to spend time over a target area measured in 
hours.  The endurance of a platform is the single most important factor in 
determining how many platforms you will need to maintain persistent ISR or 
communications over a target on the ground.  If persistence is required, and you 
are on a budget, then you can achieve this by continuously sending up 
inexpensive platforms that have little endurance or you can invest in a system 
that costs more but has much greater endurance.  If persistence were not 
required, assuming all other capabilities are equal, then the cheaper platform 
would of course be the way to proceed.  However, if persistence is necessary, as 
stated by some COCOMs, a way to maximize endurance must be found.93 
Lastly, flexibility is the ability of an asset to perform more than one mission 
simultaneously.  This MOE is, unfortunately, more qualitative than quantitative.  
All platforms have the ability to perform ISR and communications at the same 
time but not to the same degree.  Some platform optimization must take place in 
order for that alternative to be good at either one mission or the other or risk 
performing poorly at each.  Some platforms can perform ISR missions very well 
but can only perform rudimentary communications relay functions.  So, in trying 
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to determine how to rate the different platforms, each platform was assigned a 
subjective rating.  On a scale of one to five, based on current or predicted 
capabilities, each platform was assessed while performing the ISR mission and 
the communications mission, in comparison to the other platforms. 
4. Explored and Rejected MOEs 
There were a number of possible MOEs considered but rejected for 
various reasons.  The first rejected MOE was Data Quality/Quantity.  Some of the 
potential measures for this MOE would have been resolution for an ISR payload, 
and bandwidth or number of users for a communications payload.  We rejected 
this attribute from our analysis for two reasons.  First, the majority of information 
on payload capability is proprietary information and/or classified.  The analysis 
focused on publicly available information in order to reach the largest audience 
possible.  Second, the exact payloads for some of the platforms (airships and 
future TacSats) are undecided, which would have led us to guess which payload 
the DoD would procure.  Additionally, the MOE draws too much attention to the 
sensors when the thesis is concentrating on the platform.   
The next rejected MOE was Risk.  There are several elements to risk.  
Technology risk is not an issue because all platforms are at least in the prototype 
development phase.  Survivability is an element of risk – the potential risk and 
probability of platform destruction from adversarial actions.  All platforms are 
susceptible to shoot-down by a military near-peer.  Therefore, the ability to 
reconstitute might be something that is valuable.  However, reconstitution was 
very close to Responsiveness so it became a contributing factor in the platforms 
Responsiveness MOE.  For these reasons, we decided that Risk alone was not 
important enough to be an independent MOE. 
The last MOE considered and rejected was Cost.  Cost was eliminated 
when it was decided that a cost-effectiveness analysis was the direction the 
thesis would take.  For our cost-effectiveness analysis, cost is an independent  
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variable and therefore fixed.  The analysis focused on platform effectiveness 
within established cost parameters to evaluate effectiveness.  Therefore, Cost 
cannot be a MOE. 
F. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
1. The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
To assist in the analysis comparing dissimilar alternatives, we used the 
Analytic Hierarch Process (AHP); a multi-criteria decision-making technique 
developed by Thomas L. Saaty, a Professor in the Graduate School of Business 
of the University of Pittsburgh.  According to the author, the AHP’s purpose is to 
provide a “process [to be] used to develop creative courses of action and 
evaluate their effectiveness … [to] evaluate the impact of relevant factors in 
complex situations.”94   The AHP uses the notion of priority expressed in terms of 
ratios, because priority is applicable to both the MOEs and the alternatives.  To 
develop these ratios, the AHP uses paired comparisons between the 
alternatives, and between the MOEs, to develop a model for decision makers 
considering all relevant factors. 
                                            
94  Thomas L. Saaty, Decision-Making for Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy Process for Decisions in a 
Complex World, 2nd ed. ed. (Pittsburgh, PA: RWS Publications, 1990) 25. 
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Figure 9.   Hierarchy Model 
The first step in the AHP is to define the problem, which our study has 
previously stated.  The second step in the AHP is to model the problem as a 
hierarchy of interrelated tasks.  Figure 9 gives a depiction of the AHP hierarchy 
model used for our thesis.95  The top level of the model is the goal of the 
analysis, while the subordinate level lists the attributes or criteria that must be 
met to achieve the overarching goal.  For a cost effectiveness analysis, these 
attributes are the MOEs.  The bottom level of the model depicts the choices or 
alternatives available to the decision maker.   As the figure depicts, the AHP 
organizes complex decisions into its various components.  The AHP then 
analyzes these components in a pairwise comparison to develop priorities within 
the hierarchy.   
                                            
95  Saaty, 33. 
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2. Pairwise Comparison of MOEs 
The next step in the AHP is to evaluate the elements of the hierarchy by 
comparing them to one another in pairs in order to develop a scale that captures 
the relative importance of each attribute.  The purpose of this step is to determine 
the priority of these measures, from the viewpoint of the stakeholder, by 
converting them to a quantitative measure that falls within the set (0, 1).   
The pairwise comparisons within the AHP can be either quantitative 
attributes that are easily measured and compared, qualitative comparisons 
based on the level of satisfaction or preference given as an opinion, or some 
combination thereof.  Using the MOEs selected and defined for our analysis, our 
study attempted to capture the relative importance of each of them for 
comparison while also considering that the alternatives would yield widely 
varying results in their ability to meet these measures.  The quantitative 
measurement of the alternatives in our study will be discussed later.   
By measuring the relative importance of the MOEs, we can determine, 
under set conditions (i.e., a scenario) which measure is most desirable to the 
stakeholder and the impact of that preference on the remaining measures.  We 
can also examine the impact on preference that a change in conditions may 
have.  If, for example, you use the idea of building a racecar, your MOEs may 
include speed, durability, fuel consumption, and simplicity of design.  If asked to 
rank each of these MOEs on relative importance, a panel of experts may prefer 
one attribute above the other and may even change their opinion based on the 
scenario given.  For mountainous, endurance races, it may be more important 
that the car consume less fuel because the course does not support refueling 
stops.  For grueling off-road races, experts may prefer durability above other 
attributes.  The point is that one attribute often comes at the expense of others.  
It is, therefore, beneficial to know and understand which MOEs stakeholders hold 
in highest regard, so that, under established conditions, you will understand how 
this preference affects your evaluation of alternatives.  If an alternative 
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outperforms the others in one attribute, and that attribute is highly preferred by 
stakeholders for the scenario at hand, then the weighting of attribute preferences 
distinguishes the alternative as the best solution.  Conversely, an alternative 
adept in an attribute that is not highly preferred by the stakeholder may not 
emerge as the best choice for the solution.    
3. Pairwise Comparison Survey  
To derive the relative weighting values to our MOEs, we conducted a 
survey of professionals.  The survey participants ranged from professors at the 
Naval Postgraduate School teaching space systems operations, to various 
Soldiers and Marines currently assigned to billets with direct involvement in the 
establishment of requirements for and the procurement of ISR platforms.  The 
survey, shown in Appendix B, asked the participants to establish, from their 
perspective, the priority of importance of the selected MOEs within three selected 
scenarios.  Scenario A was that the United States was engaged in high intensity 
operations without air superiority.  Scenario B was that the United States was 
engaged in high intensity operations with air superiority.  Last, Scenario C was 
that the United States was engaged in low intensity operations with air 
superiority.  The scenarios were chosen to reflect the full spectrum of operations 
that today’s warfighter must be prepared to conduct, from conventional maneuver 
warfare to distributed low intensity conflict.96   
The participants were asked to rank the selected MOEs within the defined 
scenario in order to ascertain how the perceived importance of the selected 
MOEs might change within the spectrum of conflict.  To form a ratio scale we 
asked participants to evaluate the MOEs against each other and assign relative 
values to reflect their preferences.  The fundamental scale of the comparison 
used the real numbers in the open interval (0, 5) which are associated with the 
intensity of the participant’s opinion of importance or preference.   
                                            
96  The Marine Corps: "A Step Ahead..." Facing Future Challenges Slide 20. 
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Before analyzing the data from the survey, it is important to note that 
some decision scientists have criticized the use of ratio scales to arrive at a 
decision.  One of the pitfalls often associated with analysis of varying alternatives 
is the artificiality of known scales of measurement (or conveniently improvised 
numbers) to make decisions.  This often happens from the misuse of 
normalization.  As Saaty describes: 
Among the various number crunching procedures the most 
pernicious is that which assigns judgments to alternatives…by first 
selecting numbers from some arbitrary set and then normalizing 
them by multiplying them by a constant that is the reciprocal of their 
sum.  [The] normalized sets now lie in the interval [0, 1], no matter 
what scale they originally came from, and can be passed off to the 
uninitiated as comparable.97 
The problem compounds when the issue is a multi-criteria decision.  Comparing 
ratio scales developed for each criterion cannot assist with a unique overall 
decision.  To avoid this issue, Saaty recommends using ratio scales in the 
weighting operation to help preserve proportionality before and after 
normalization.   
To understand how the AHP uses the pairwise comparison within the 
hierarchical decision tree, an explanation of the process is required.  Several 
websites provide details and tutorials on the AHP.  The following example mirrors 
one such tutorial.98  In our survey, we asked participants to compare the MOEs 
to each other in pairs, assigning rank according to their preference of one MOE 
over the other.  The scale depicted in Figure 10 shows how the assignment of 
preference works.  For our example, we are comparing responsiveness and 
endurance.  A weighting assignment on the scale to the left of one indicates the 
survey participant prefers responsiveness to endurance.  Numbers to the right  
 
                                            
97  Thomas L. Saaty, "Decision Making, Scaling, And Number Crunching," Decision Sciences 20.2 
(1989): 405. 
98  Analytic Hierarchy Process AHP Tutorial,  August 26, 2008 
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indicate a preference of the endurance attribute.  If both attributes are considered 
to be of equal importance, the respondent indicates this preference by assigning 
a one to the comparison.   
 
Figure 10.   MOE Preference Scale 
The survey asked respondents to continue this paired comparison for all 
attributes, which in our study equates to the five MOEs.  The responses to the 
pairwise comparison are used to populate a reciprocal matrix, where responses 
are entered into the top half of the matrix, and the reciprocal values are entered 
into the bottom half to create a comparison matrix (Figure 11).  From the 
reciprocal matrix the AHP computes the five corresponding Eigen vectors, which 
we computed using MATLAB for our example (Figure 12).  The principal Eigen 
vector corresponds to the highest Eigen value (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 11.   Reciprocal Matrix of Pairwise Comparisons 
 
 
Figure 12.   Corresponding Eigen Vectors from Reciprocal Matrix 
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Figure 13.   Principle Eigen Vector from Reciprocal Matrix 
The sum of the column of the principle Eigen vector in our example is 
1.9988.  Using this number to normalize the values in the matrix, we get the 
values that correspond to preference in the pairwise comparison (Figure 14).   
 
Figure 14.   Normalized Principle Eigen Vector 
What the matrix above example tells us is that the survey respondent, in 
the pairwise comparison of all the MOEs, most preferred the access attribute 
(36.4%), followed by responsiveness (27%), coverage (13.3%), endurance 
(11.4%), and flexibility (11.9%). 
4. The Analytical Hierarchy Process and Consistency 
One construct that distinguishes the AHP from other decision processes is 
the allowance for inconsistency in the comparisons.99  In mathematics, the 
property of transitivity simply states that if A>B, and B>C, then A>C.  
Furthermore, if A is 5 times greater than B, and B is 3 times greater than C, then 
A must be 15 times greater than C.  In the AHP, the transitive property is still 
relevant when applied to choices.  However, due to human nature when making 
comparisons, respondents often give inconsistent answers with regard to the 
                                            
99  Analytic Hierarchy Process AHP Tutorial. 
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second principle of transitivity, which is the degree of preference.  Thus, Saaty 
has allowed within the AHP a level of acceptable inconsistency based upon the 
number of choices available to the decision maker.  When making a pairwise 
comparison, a decision maker must still be consistent as to which alternative is 
preferred.  However, he now has an allowable level of inconsistency in relation to 
the degree of preference expressed, so that “… [the process] is not inhibited by 
the need for transitive relationships and instead of ignoring such relationships, 
provides a measure of inconsistency so that the decision maker can proceed 
accordingly.”100  This is especially important when comparing attributes or 
alternatives where no quantitative data is available.   
To determine consistency, the AHP computes the Eigen value of the 
reciprocal matrix of pairwise comparisons.  From our example reciprocal matrix 
above, we computed the corresponding Eigen values using MATLAB (Figure 15).  
Important to the process of establishing a consistency rating is the identification 
of the principle Eigen value.  The principle Eigen value is the largest Eigen value 
from the matrix (Figure 16).   
 
Figure 15.   Corresponding Eigen Value from the Reciprocal Matrix 
 
Figure 16.   Principle Eigen Value 
                                            
100  Ernest H. Forman and Saul I. Gass, "The Analytic Hierarchy Process: An Exposition," Operations 
research 49.4 (2001): 48. 
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To evaluate consistency, the AHP uses the ratio of the Consistency Index 
(CI) to the Random Consistency index (RI).101  Perfect consistency within the 
comparison survey is achieved when the principle Eigen value is equal to the 
number of objects compared.  For our pairwise comparison survey, we asked 
respondents to compare the five attributes for preference (n=5).  The 
Consistency Index measures the degree of difference between these two 
numbers (Figure 17).  The Random Consistency Index (RI) is a table derived by 
Saaty that gives inconsistency allowances based on the number of choices 
available, so that a minimum of 10% allowance is included in every matrix size 
(Figure 18).  
 
Figure 17.   Consistency Index 
 
 
Figure 18.   Random Consistency Index102 
To compute the overall Consistency Ratio for the survey, the ratio shown 
in Figure 19 is calculated.  When CR < 10%, the survey results are considered 
within the acceptable standards for the AHP.   For our example, the results show 
the Consistency Ratio outside the accepted range.  In this case, the survey 
results may be excluded from the study or a new survey with clearer instructions 
may be necessary.   
 
Figure 19.   Consistency Ratio Calculation 
                                            
101  Saaty, 85-89. 
102  Analytic Hierarchy Process AHP Tutorial. 
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5. Applying the Analytical Hierarchy Process to Attain MOE 
Weights 
The study used Expert Choice 2000® decision support software, designed 
to implement the AHP, to derive a dominance matrix from the participant 
responses and then use this matrix to assign relative values to each of the MOEs 
as described earlier.  After receiving all the surveys, the raw scores were input 
into an Excel spreadsheet.  A linear transformation formula, Equation 1, was 
applied to the raw scores to convert them to the scale used by the Expert Choice 










Equation 1:  Linear Transform Formula103 
 
Figure 20 shows the pairwise comparison matrix populated with the 
average survey results for scenario A.  From the matrix, our study utilized the 
AHP to develop the relative weights for each MOE for scenario A, utilizing the 
mathematical concepts described earlier, and depicted in Figure 21.  For 
scenario A, we can see that survey respondents regarded access as the most 
important trait for an ISR or communications platform to have.  Figure 22 shows 
the average survey response input for scenario B.  Survey respondents indicate 
a preference for endurance for this scenario, as depicted in Figure 23.  The 
survey matrix for scenario C is Figure 24.  Coverage was the most dominant 
attribute preferred for this scenario, as shown in Figure 25. 
                                            
103  Analytic Hierarchy Process AHP Tutorial 3. 
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As seen in the bottom left corner of each figure, the Consistency Ratio is 
0.02 for each scenario.  Since the inconsistency tolerance utilized by the AHP is 
10% or less, the overall consistency ratio for our survey is mathematically 
consistent within the AHP defined limits.   
 
Figure 20.   MOE Survey Results for Scenario A 
 
 
Figure 21.   Scenario A MOE Weights Based On Survey Results 
 
 




Figure 23.   Scenario B MOE Weights Based on Survey Results 
 
 
Figure 24.   MOE Survey Results for Scenario C 
 
 
Figure 25.   Scenario C MOE Weights Based on Survey Results 
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G.  PLATFORM CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT 
After completing the MOE evaluation and processing the results using the 
AHP to formulate a score for each MOE within each scenario, we began the 
process of evaluating the individual platforms within each scenario for 
comparison.  To begin the process, tables were created depicting the pros and 
cons for each platform under each MOE, as shown in Appendix A.  The 
information in the tables is not rank ordered in any way.  The subsequent step 
entailed a pairwise comparison of the individual platforms within each scenario.   
1. Assumptions 
In order to conduct the comparison we made several assumptions that 
would allow us to effectively draw out the individual strengths and weaknesses of 
each platform within the given scenario.  These assumptions include the 
following sections. 
a.  ORS is a Functional Program 
We assumed the Operationally Responsive Space program is 
functioning within its designed concept.  In order to compare the ability of the 
platforms to replace lost assets, which was covered by our definition of 
responsiveness, we had to assume that lost TacSat assets could be replaced 
within the design concept of this program.  
b. Pre-positioned Forces 
Similar to any military operation in a foreign theater, we assumed 
assets would be pre-positioned in or near theater to support  deployed forces.  
This allowed us more realistically evaluate responsiveness. 
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c. No Assets are Held in Reserve 
We assumed that all available assets would be utilized to support 
forces within each scenario.  This may seem intuitive, however, risk aversion 
may prompt some to believe that we would not employ some assets until certain 
conditions had been met on the battlefield.  An example would be high intensity 
combat without air superiority.  Although not ideal, history has proven that this 
worst-case scenario is a possibility that the DoD must be prepared to conduct, 
and that in this environment every available asset would be used to support the 
warfighter on the ground, regardless of the value of the asset.  
d. Platforms Must Move 
We assumed the acquisition of new targets in new geographical 
areas would require the platform to move from its current location.  Since our 
analysis was designed to assess the capability of the individual platforms and not 
the sensors they carry, the assessment of responsiveness would require the 
platform to relocate and not just move its sensors to cover new areas of interest. 
e. Platform Dynamics and Limitations Apply to Each 
Scenario 
An assessment of the endurance of the individual platforms must 
take into consideration how the asset would be employed, to include such things 
as range limitations, level of authority for the assets use, etc.  This too may seem 
intuitive, however, in comparing simple platform metrics, this can lead to 
erroneous results.  For example, the flight time duration of many medium altitude 
UAS appear to give the asset a broad range of coverage, if the asset were on a 
straight line, one-way trip.  However, the normal operating range for the asset 
and its typical employment is well within these limits. 
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f. Only the Scenario at Hand is Evaluated 
For the sake of consistency, no consideration is given to the normal 
culminating points or tempo of combat operations.  Normal combat operational 
tempo results in periods of high and low intensity combat as units reach the limits 
of their logistical reach or require time to regroup and, therefore, transition 
between periods of offensive and defensive operations.  For our comparison of 
each platform within the given scenarios, only the scenario at hand was 
considered, without regard to the transition that may occur to the other scenarios.   
g. Only Single Platform Comparisons 
For comparison, only singular platforms were considered.  The 
entire "system" or overlapping use of platforms to provide continued target 
acquisition would not effectively differentiate the capabilities of the alternatives, 
and, therefore, was not considered.   
Using these assumptions, we compared each of the platforms 
together in a qualitative assessment within each scenario.  From this 
assessment, we developed pairwise comparison scores to enter into the Expert 
Choice 2000 program and derive an AHP result.  The platform databases reflect 
the changes in the qualitative assessment of each platform within each scenario.   
Along with the qualitative assessment of the alternatives, we also 
attempted to quantify the attributes of the platforms for metric comparison.  
Although the AHP results are not derived from this quantification, comparison of 
the results with our qualitative assessment assisted in validating our results.  The 
entire table of platform metrics used to quantify the capability of each of the 
alternatives for comparison is in Appendix C.  Since the intangible benefits these 
systems provide often escape quantification, our initial concern in evaluating the 
platforms was that the alternatives might be extremely difficult to compare and 
that finding comparable measures with attainable data for quantitative analysis 
would be difficult to achieve.   
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In the following sections, we will try to capture both aspects of the 
platform analysis.  The first part of each section discusses the platform 
capabilities and the qualitative assessment conducted for comparison.  The 
second part of each section discusses the quantitative analysis we conducted for 
comparison to our qualitative assessment results.  Finally, at the end of the 
qualitative and quantitative comparisons, we provide the AHP results for each of 
the platforms within the given scenarios.  For the sake of consistency throughout 
the analysis, all references to alternatives follow the numbering system listed in 
Table 2.   
 
Table 2.   Alternative Numbers 
2. Platform Responsiveness Qualitative Assessment 
Responsiveness was earlier defined as the ability to react to new missions 
in a different geographical area and begin passing the user actionable data.  
Additionally, it is the ability to replace an asset if lost.  The following assumptions 
were made.  First, the platform is already airborne when directed to execute a 
new mission.  Second, if an asset is lost, the replacement platform is not 
airborne, but ready to respond when replacement is necessary.  Each platform 
was evaluated against this definition, with the stated assumptions, and the 
conclusions are explained below. 
a.  Tactical Satellites 
Tactical Satellites have a number of advantages and disadvantages 
in Responsiveness.  First, TacSats do not necessarily need a forward-based or 
in-theater footprint to be responsive to new tasking.  (Theater commanders may 
eventually request the capability for direct theater downlink for a long duration 
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mission, but it is not necessary at mission inception.)  In the event of responding 
to a new mission in a different geographical area, the TacSat may not require 
any adjustments for expeditious response.  Physics dictates the orbital 
mechanics and, in many cases, a TacSat already in orbit might be the fastest 
platform to respond.  Additionally, a single TacSat might be able to respond to 
multiple new missions nearly simultaneously due to its global access (orbit 
dependant).  Some of the TacSat drawbacks include possible delays in response 
if the satellite just made a pass over the target area once a new mission is 
identified.  Additionally, if a satellite is in a low-inclination orbit, and a mission is 
identified in a high latitude location, then a satellite might not be able to respond 
at all if it is not carrying enough fuel to make the inclination change.  If a TacSat 
is lost and a replacement is necessary, the infrastructure to do so in a timely 
manner today does not exist.  Future progress in ORS is necessary for satellite 
responsiveness to become a reality.   
b. High Altitude Airships 
High Altitude Airships, like TacSats, have the advantage of not 
needing a forward-deployed footprint to conduct missions or replace a lost asset.  
This enables quicker response to new missions in distant locations or locations 
with limited support infrastructure.  Additionally, HAAs have the ability to change 
payloads based on mission requirements.  However, HAAs do have a slow 
cruising speed (about 30 knots) which must be taken into consideration.  For new 
missions in the same geographic area this might not be an issue because of its 
large coverage area, but if a lengthy transit is required, the HAA may need days 
to respond.  Additionally, payload swap-out may require a trip back to the hangar, 
which will not be in-theater.  Lastly, the HAA may be limited based on its 
decreased access to high latitudes during winter months. 
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c. High Altitude UAS 
High Altitude UAS, the Global Hawk for thesis purposes, would 
most likely be the first airborne asset available for a new mission in a distant 
geographic area because of its long range and high speed.  This long range 
allows it to operate at great distances from its base, but forward bases, not 
necessarily in theater, are required.  Like the HAA, the Global Hawk can change 
payloads for specialized missions.  Since visits to base are more frequent with 
the Global Hawk, payload exchange can be done more easily than with the HAA. 
d. Medium Altitude UAS 
Medium Altitude UAS, like the Army Sky-Warrior, due to the level of 
control (the division level) may be the most responsive to the tactical warfighter.  
The Sky-Warrior can quickly respond to new missions within their current 
geographic area.  However, they do require a significant amount of forward 
deployed support and therefore are unable to quickly respond to a new mission 
outside of their current theater.   
e. Considerations 
In assessing the responsiveness of each platform, we considered 
each vehicle's ability to travel to the newly designated target (driven by platform 
speed or advertised response timeline for ORS).  Consider, for example, the slow 
speed of the airship to move to new targets and to move replacement assets into 
place for lost platforms in contrast with the speed of the other platforms.  With a 
functioning ORS program, TacSat assets could be launched on short notice to 
provide operational support within hours.  Assuming that the HAA would have to 
reposition to respond to a newly identified target outside of its footprint, the 
TacSat may be the more responsive asset (dependent on the distance the 
airship would have to travel to acquire the target and the amount of time until the 
TacSat orbit would encompass the target within its footprint).   
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For asset replacement, this would also be the case.  Using the 
capability of the ORS program, lost assets could be replaced within hours, 
whereas to replace a lost HAA asset, even from forward deployed bases, would 
likely take longer.   
With forward deployed assets, and with the speed of the platform, 
the High-Altitude UAV would most likely be able to respond to new targets more 
quickly than the TacSat, even with an ORS capability.  Likewise, to replace a lost 
asset, whether from CONUS or from bases overseas, the High-Altitude UAV 
would likely provide a more responsive capability than the TacSat. 
When considering the Medium-Altitude UAV, we also considered 
the level of authority at which it is retained and tasked.  Additionally, since it is a 
division level asset, and not a strategic asset like the other alternatives, it would 
likely be closer to the forces in need of its use.  Likewise, the command chain to 
request its employment or launch a replacement asset would be shorter, which 
ultimately equates to more responsiveness.  The nature of the other platforms, as 
strategic assets, would more than likely take longer to respond to the warfighter's 
request for new target coverage.   
3. Platform Responsiveness Quantitative Assessment   
For the quantitative analysis of platform responsiveness, we attempted to 
capture the ability of each platform to respond to a new target in a new 
geographic location, measured in hours (Table 3).  To measure the ability of 
each alternative to respond, we calculated the amount of time each platform 




Table 3.   Distance Table104 
For the sake of our evaluation, we chose the middle distance (885 
kilometers) as the required distance of travel to the new area of interest, as the 
task to travel across theater is the most likely scenario for our alternatives.   
Ultimately, any distance that would require the platform to move to a new location 
could be used for comparison.  We then used the platform characteristics to 
determine the length of time required for the alternative to reach the new 
geographic area.  The results are shown in Table 4.  For alternatives 2-4, we 
assumed the area of interest to be along a linear path from the platform’s current 
location.  However, we did not take into consideration any operating range 
limitations of the individual platforms, but instead operated under the assumption 
that users employing the platforms would do this.  To achieve the results, we 
divided the distance traveled by the speed of each platform (56, 630, and 218 
kilometers per hour, respectively).105 106 107  
 
 
                                            
104  Google Earth, August 27, 2008 <http://earth.google.com/>. 
105  Jamison, Porche, and Sommer, 16. 
106  Global Hawk - US AIR FORCE / Fact Sheet 1oct2005, October 1, 2005, August 19, 2008 2008 
<http://www.mindfully.org/Technology/2005/Global-Hawk-USAF1oct05.htm>. 




Table 4.   Quantitative Responsiveness Assessment  
Since the TacSat is subject to the physical constraints of orbital 
mechanics, a straight-line distance measurement does not neatly apply for the 
sake of comparison.  Instead, we used the average of the best and worst-case 
travel times for the platform with regard to orbital parameters and average 
response time to a new area of interest along the earth’s equator.  For the LEO 
ISR platform, the best-case scenario is when the new geographic area of interest 
is within the footprint of the next orbiting pass of the satellite.  With an altitude of 
410 kilometers in a circular orbit, the next orbital pass over the area of interest 
would be within its orbital period of 1.5 hours.  The worst-case scenario for the 
LEO platform is when it has just passed over the area of interest and will not 
revisit the location until the earth completes its revolution, or approximately 22 
hours later.  Table 5 shows how we obtained the orbital period and revisit time for 
the LEO platform.  Since a newly identified area of interest may fall within either 
of these cases, we used the average of the two to establish a responsiveness 





Table 5.   Determination of Period and Revisit Time for LEO Platform108 
Likewise, the HEO platform response time is best analyzed in light of the 
orbital constraints on the vehicle.  The best-case scenario is when the area of 
interest is within the coverage area of the platform.  With a dwell time at apoapsis 
of 1-2 hours per orbit and six orbital revolutions per day, the HEO platform (with 
its large footprint area) provides some persistence that the LEO platform does 
not offer.109  The worst-case scenario for the HEO platform is when it completes 
its dwell time and begins its approach toward periapsis.  During this time in its 
orbit, as the earth spins beneath its orbit, the platform will have a coverage gap 
of 24 hours before it returns to the target area.  An average time to attain a target 
in a new geographic area is, therefore, the average of these two cases, or 12 
hours.  Table 6 shows how we obtained the orbital period and revisit time for the 
HEO platform.   
 
                                            
108  Wiley J. Larson and James Richard Wertz, Space Mission Analysis and Design, 3rd ed. (El 
Segundo, Calif; Dordrecht; Boston: Microcosm; Kluwer, 1999) 137, 172. 
109  Doyne, et al. 
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Table 6.   Determination of Period and Revisit Time for HEO Platform110 
4. Platform Responsiveness AHP Results 
The following show the platform qualitative analysis results of 
responsiveness in the various given scenarios using Expert Choice 2000 and 
applying the AHP (Figures 26-28).    The results show that the medium altitude 
UAS was assessed as providing the most responsiveness in all three scenarios.  
These results are similar to the quantitative results, although they differ in the 
assessment of the two UAS platforms.  This is because the quantitative analysis 
only considers the platform speed when assessing responsiveness, whereas the 
qualitative analysis also considers the level of authority at which control over the 
various platforms is maintained and relative proximity to the target.   
 
 
Figure 26.   Platform AHP Results for Responsiveness in Scenario A 
                                            
110  Elliptical Orbit Calculator, September 11, 2008 <http://inkido.indiana.edu/a100/a100_ellipse.html>. 
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Figure 27.   Platform AHP Results for Responsiveness in Scenario B 
 
Figure 28.   Platform AHP Results for Responsiveness in Scenario C 
5. Platform Access Qualitative Assessment 
Access was defined earlier as the geographic extent of what the payload 
can see over time – i.e. no time limit; for example, a single satellite in polar orbit 
has a global access area.  This is critically important when you have a great need 
to see into an uncooperative state in peacetime or into an area where you lack 
air superiority during wartime.  Ideally, you would have low altitude global access 
at all times. 
a.  Tactical Satellites 
TacSats with an inclination of approximately 90o have global 
access.  Satellites with an inclination of less than 90o can provide access to the 
latitude equal to and below their inclination (some access may be achieved at 
slightly higher latitude depending upon satellite altitude and sensor field of view).  
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Sovereign airspace does not exist at orbital altitudes and therefore satellites do 
not need over-flight permissions from hostile nations.  This gives the satellite the 
unimpeded ability to collect intelligence on a global scale.   
b. High Altitude Airships 
High Altitude Airships are capable of accessing most areas over the 
earth.  Airships are not limited by fuel requirements due to their solar panels and 
hydrogen fuel cells.  Therefore, they effectively have an unlimited range.  As 
briefly stated earlier, polar access (above 60o latitude) is limited to summer 
months due to the amount of sunlight needed to power the airship via its 
photovoltaic solar panels.  Additionally, some latitudes might experience some 
seasonal variations in the winds at high altitudes that might not be favorable to 
airship operations.  Yet, because of their altitude, airships are not greatly affected 
by most weather.  As with UAS and other aircraft, HAA’s will need over-flight 
authorization to enter the sovereign airspace of other nations during peacetime 
or air superiority during wartime.  These platforms do have some access to 
denied areas and their ability to peer into areas where air superiority has not 
been established.  However, they are at risk when doing so. 
c.  High Altitude UAS 
High Altitude UAS such as the Global Hawk also have a number of 
limitations on their access.  First, the Global Hawk engines are powered by fuel 
and therefore have a limited range (2400 nm radius with the ability to provide 24 
hours time-on-station).111  Global Hawk has the ability to cruise at high altitudes, 
above most of the weather problems, but, as with most aircraft, dealing with 
inclement weather at lower altitudes can be problematic.  Additionally, as with 
other aircraft Global Hawks will need over-flight authorization to enter the 
sovereign airspace of other nations during peacetime or air superiority during 
                                            
111  Global Hawk - US AIR FORCE / Fact Sheet 1oct2005. 
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wartime.  However, because of their altitude, the can peer somewhat into denied 
areas from safe sanctuaries, or fly into denied areas at risk. 
d. Medium Altitude UAS 
Medium Altitude UAS such as the Sky-Warrior have the greatest 
limitation on their access.   They are limited by all the elements that limit the 
Global Hawk but to a greater extent in range and weather limitations. 
e.  Considerations 
One of the key strengths of any satellite is its ability to see into 
denied territory.  When assessing the platform access capability before air 
superiority is established, we assumed the other assets would still be used but 
that their access would be limited. 
The most likely employment technique for airborne platforms before 
air superiority is established would be to constrain their use to the immediately 
airspace from the rear area of operations up to the forward line of troops (FLOT).  
Even though total air superiority is not yet established, military forces will attempt 
to establish control of the airspace above ground forces in order to support to the 
warfighter on the ground.  Constraining the airborne assets to this area, however, 
would limit their ability to gain access to the denied territory beyond the FLOT, 
which would be a function of their individual sensor capability, the altitude at 
which they operate, and the limitations established for their employment (i.e., 
how close they were allowed to get to the denied territory).   
Regardless, if the situation called for it and access was essential for 
warfighter support, the platform most likely to be employed inside denied territory 
would probably be the medium altitude UAV.  This target is the least expensive of 
the alternatives, has enough range to gain access to a large portion of denied 
territory once launched, provides the smallest target footprint for the enemy, and 
can be flown at various altitudes to make surface-to-air missile targeting much 
more difficult.   
 78
Once air superiority is attained, all the platforms would have equal 
access to the area of interest.  The relative superiority of the satellite in this 
attribute would then be greatly reduced. 
6.  Platform Access Quantitative Assessment  
For our quantitative analysis of access, we attempted to capture the ability 
of each platform to provide access to denied territory.  The TacSat alternative 
has no limitations on access if it is in an orbit of the appropriate inclination for the 
area of interest.  The percentage of the earth’s surface it can see is a matter of 
the orbital constraints applied at launch.  The decisions of the platform users are 
the driving factor in deciding such orbital parameters as altitude, orbit type, and 
inclination based on mission analysis and type of coverage desired.  To assess 
the access capability of Alternatives 2-4 we used the scenario of how much 
access into North Korea the alternatives would be able to gain if employed from 
South Korea or international waters, given as a percentage of the total land mass 
of the country, or 120,540 km2.112  As shown in Figure 29, the circular footprint of 
each platform is a function of altitude and the viewing angle capability of the 
sensor.  To assess the access area of each platform, we first had to find the 
radius of each alternative's footprint by applying the trigonometric function shown 
below. 
                                            




Figure 29.   Sensor Footprint Radius Diagram 
To determine the percentage of denied territory each alternative is 
capable of accessing, we made several assumptions.  First, we assumed each 
platform is only able to access from outside the denied territory’s boundaries.  By 
definition, “denied” implies this standard, however, access could be gained if, 
under duress, loss of the platform is a risk that the warfighter is willing to bear.  
Secondly, for the sake of geometric simplicity, the land mass given for North 
Korea was used to calculate the area of a circle for platform access comparison.  
Finally, for consistency, we used a 20 degree off nadir pointing angle for all three 
platforms, which is a common capability found on commercial imaging 
satellites.113  If considering communications access, platforms could potentially 
look almost to the horizon depending of the frequency in use.  However, if 
                                            
113  WorldView-1 Satellite Sensor Specifications and Information | Satellite Imaging Corp, August 27, 
2008 <http://www.satimagingcorp.com/satellite-sensors/worldview-1.html>. 
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imagery is normally the primary concern, and given no ‘stand-off’ distance for the 
platform, Figure 30 depicts how the amount of access of each platform into 
denied territory is a factor of half of its footprint area.  The radius of the denied 
territory minus the radius of the platform sensor allows us to calculate how much 
of the denied territory is out of the reach of each alternative.  Appendix E 
contains the table depicting the calculations to determine access area.  Table 7 
below depicts the results of those calculations. 
 
Figure 30.   Access Measurement 
 
Table 7.   Quantitative Access Assessment 
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7. Platform Access AHP Results 
The results of the qualitative assessment mirror the results of the 
quantitative analysis (Figures 31 and 32).  The satellite platforms obviously have 
no access limitations in scenario A, unlike the other platforms.  In addition, the 
range limitations and altitude of employment, which affect access in scenario A, 
are also reflected in the results.  By contrast, once air superiority is attained 
(scenarios B and C), all the alternatives would have equal access to denied 
territory, as indicated by the AHP scores. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Platform AHP Results for Access in Scenario A 
 
 
Figure 32.   Platform AHP Results for Access in Scenario B & C 
8. Platform Coverage Qualitative Assessment 
Coverage is defined above as an indication of how quickly the system can 
view the access area measured in hours.  This dictates how well you can 
conduct your mission within your access area. 
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a. Tactical Satellites 
TacSats, because of their high altitude have the greatest access, 
but not the greatest coverage.  Coverage rates will vary depending on the type of 
orbit.  Orbits are generally optimized for the spacecraft mission.  Imaging 
satellites are normally placed in low earth orbit (LEO) to maximize their imaging 
resolution.  The disadvantage of LEO orbit is that satellites at lower altitudes 
have the greatest velocity (as opposed to satellites in higher orbits) and therefore 
spend only short amounts of time over the target area – normally only five to ten 
minutes.  The result is a small and fast moving coverage area.  It is important to 
understand that access does not automatically equate to more imaging on the 
part of ISR platforms.  It is simply the potential area within which the platform can 
image.  An example would be the IKONOS earth imaging satellite.  At 680 
kilometers altitude, the IKONOS has a very large access area; however, the 
images that IKONOS provides are typically 121 km2 -- much smaller than the 
actual access area.114  By contrast, communications satellites are generally 
placed in higher orbits to increase the size of their footprint and to maximize their 
dwell time over a certain geographic area.  The representative communications 
satellite, TacSat-4, uses a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) to accomplish this.  This 
type of orbit results in a larger and slower moving coverage footprint. 
b. High Altitude Airships 
High Altitude Airships, due to their altitude, have a large footprint.  
The footprint of a single airship covers almost all of Afghanistan.  However, 
because the airship remains relatively stationary, it has all the time necessary too 
fully image everything in its footprint.  Airships, if payload volume and mass 
allows, may be able to place multiple cameras aboard to complete multiple 
taskings at once. 
                                            
114  Spot Image - Ikonos, September 5, 2008 <http://www.spotimage.fr/web/en/183-ikonos.php>. 
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c.  High Altitude UAS 
High Altitude UAS normally operate at the same relative altitude as 
the high altitude airships.  This allows them similar sensor coverage area.  
However, because of their greater forward air speed, high altitude UAS can move 
quicker to provide coverage outside of their immediate footprint if necessary.  An 
additional benefit that a high altitude UAS is that it can lower its altitude to 
capture high priority EO/IR images below cloud cover when required.   
d. Medium Altitude UAS 
Medium Altitude UAS operate at a much lower altitude (25,000 ft 
vs. 65,000 ft) than their high altitude counterparts do.  This results in a smaller 
sensor footprint.  However, medium-altitude UAS attempt to compensate with 
their high forward airspeed to cover areas that an airship and high-altitude UAS 
can provide coverage for based on their altitude.  
e. Considerations 
Although the TacSat can access more area than the other 
platforms in scenario A, the amount of ISR coverage the LEO platform can 
achieve within its access area is limited because of its limited persistence in its 
orbital flight. 
Assuming the same sensor package is used aboard both the 
airship and high altitude UAS platform, the mission duration limitations of the HA 
UAV would hamper its ability provide a continuous flow of coverage data.  
However, since both platforms operate at the same altitude the HA UAV gains a 
slight edge because of its maneuverability.  The equal mission duration times of 
the high and medium altitude UAS allow both platforms to provide coverage of a 
larger area, but the higher altitude of the HA UAS gives the platform the 
opportunity to provide more coverage.   
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9.  Platform Coverage Quantitative Assessment 
The study calculated order of magnitude coverage for each platform and 
listed the results in hours (Table 8).  Coverage calculations included the amount 
of time necessary for a platform to image an area of 120,540 km2 (the area of 
North Korea).115  Satellite Toolkit simulations were run using the Quickbird 
satellite orbital information because it closely mirrors the orbit of TacSat-2.  The 
simulation revealed that it would take 24 days for the satellite to image the entire 
land mass.  However, vendor statistics for the Global Hawk Integrated Sensor 
Suite state that the Global Hawk can image 40,000 nm2 (137,192 km2) in 24 
hours.116  Assuming the sensor capabilities of the HAA are equal to or better 
than those of the Global Hawk, then each platform can image the land mass in 
less than one day.  The Sky Warrior footprint is roughly 1/3 of the footprint of the 
Global Hawk and HAA.  Therefore, we estimate that it will take three times as 
long to image the same land area.  The Footprint width calculations utilized 
several equations from Wertz and Larson.117  Appendix D gives a complete 
listing of footprint width calculations for each platform.   
 
 
Table 8.   Quantitative Coverage Assessment 
10. Platform Coverage AHP Results 
The results of the qualitative assessment are shown in Figures 33-35.  
The AHP results show that even though the LEO satellite platform may have 
                                            
115  List of Countries by Land Mass [Ranked by Area]. 
116  Raytheon, 2. 
117  Larson and Wertz, 166. 
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advantages in access for scenario A, its limited time over the target area would 
greatly decrease its ability to provide coverage of the area of interest.  These 
results are similar to those we found in the quantitative analysis.  Although the 
quantitative results show that the airship and high altitude UAV provide equal 
coverage of the designated land mass, the mobility of the UAV gives it a 
considerable edge in coverage in the qualitative analysis.   
 
 
Figure 33.   Platform AHP Results for Coverage in Scenario A 
 
Figure 34.   Platform AHP Results for Coverage in Scenario B 
 
Figure 35.   Platform AHP Results for Coverage in Scenario C 
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11. Platform Endurance Qualitative Assessment 
a. Tactical Satellites 
TacSats, as for coverage, vary in this MOE depending on the type 
of orbit in which they are placed.  Satellites in LEO (the normal orbit for imaging 
satellites) have only a small fraction of the endurance of other platforms.  Higher 
orbits result in greater endurance.  However, even in the HEO proposed by 
TacSat-4, endurance is not the TacSat’s strong suit (only one to two hours of 
dwell per pass with approximately three passes per day).118  Therefore, to 
achieve a high level of endurance with a TacSat, a constellation of satellites 
would be required so that as one is passing over the horizon, another one is 
already in place and delivering the required services.  
b.  High Altitude Airships 
High Altitude Airships have the greatest endurance of the proposed 
platforms.  The objective HAA will attempt to achieve a year of on-station time.  
This results in a high degree of confidence that the platform will be there and 
ready when needed.   
c. High Altitude UAS 
High Altitude UAS (the Global Hawk) can remain aloft for 
approximately 38 hours at a time.  However, UAS require a great amount of 
maintenance and fuel to consistently achieve this level of endurance.  As 
described later, they can maintain an average availability rate of just over 30%.  
Therefore, as with TacSats, multiple platforms will be needed to maintain the 
desired level of endurance for persistent ISR and communications if more than 
38 hours of support is needed.   
                                            
118  Doyne, et al, 4. 
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d. Medium Altitude UAS 
Medium Altitude UAS almost mirror the high altitude UAS in their 
endurance.  The Sky Warrior has approximately 36 hours of endurance as 
opposed to the Global Hawks’ 38 hours of endurance.119 
e. Considerations 
The real strength of the airship is in its individual platform 
endurance and payload capacity.  The HAA has the ability to spend more time 
providing data of its coverage area.  This may be of somewhat diminished 
significance in scenario A, due to the TacSat's ability to access more area.  If the 
warfighter wants ISR data of a target that the HAA cannot access then he really 
does not care how long the platform can stay aloft.  However, as the scenario 
changes, the endurance quality may become a more important trait to the 
warfighter, e.g., fleeting targets in low-intensity operations.  It is also important to 
note that the endurance attribute is not as significant when the airship is 
compared to the HEO communications satellite, with its longer dwell time over 
the target area. 
Although the endurance of HAA is much better than both the UAV 
platforms, the importance of that trait within scenario A may be much lower than 
in scenario B or C.  Within scenario A, although the airship dominates in its ability 
to provide endurance, if the HAA cannot access the target where coverage is 
needed, the platform's endurance is meaningless.  The warfighter would gladly 
give up some of that capability to gain in the other attributes such as access. 
12. Platform Endurance Quantitative Assessment 
The study measured each alternative’s endurance in hours, as shown in 
Table 9.  For the sake of comparison, in the calculation for endurance 
 
                                            
119  Sky-Warrior ERMP UAV System. 
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for each alternative we made the stipulation that the measurement would span 
the length of six months to ensure we understood the alternative’s comparative 
ability.    
 
Table 9.   Quantitative Endurance Assessment 
For the LEO platform in Alternative 1, we obtained the maximum time in 
view for a single target on the ground at zero degrees elevation from Space 
Mission Analysis and Design.120  Mission briefings for the Alternative 1 HEO 
platform provided the maximum time in view for this vehicle.121  The typical 
mission duration for Alternative 2 is six months, so this platform is capable of 
providing continuous coverage over the established time.  To calculate 
endurance for Alternative 3 and Alternative 4 we used a calculation for utility from 
a previous study.122  The function defines the proportion of time spent on station 
by the UAV in performing its mission, and is calculated using Equations 2 and 3.  
The study showed that the mission utility of Alternative 3 ranged from 0.21-0.42.  
For our endurance calculation, we used the average of this range, or a mission 
utility of 0.315.  We multiplied this percentage against the total possible hours in 
six months to determine endurance for the platform.   Since Alternative 4 
possesses a proportionate mission duration capability to Alternative 3, we 
applied the same mission utility measurement to calculate endurance for 
Alternative 4 as well.   
                                            
120  Larson and Wertz, Back cover, column 9. 
121  Doyne, et al. 
122  ""Competitive Sourcing"," OMB Memorandum M-07-01, Report to Congress on FY 2006 (2005) 
28/07/2008 <http://management.energy.gov/cs_report_fy2006.pdf>. 
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Time on StationUAV Utility=
Mission Cycle Time
 
Equation 2:   UAV Utility Measurement 
 
Mission Cycle Time=Time on Station + Transit Time + Maintenance Time  
Equation 3:   UAV Mission Cycle Time 
 
13. Platform Endurance AHP Results 
The results of the qualitative assessments are shown in Figures 36-38.  
The AHP results show that, as in the quantitative assessment, HAA platform 
dominates in the endurance attribute.  Likewise, the LEO ISR platform's 
assessment in the endurance attribute continuously ranks as the weakest 
platform.    
 
 
Figure 36.   Platform AHP Results for Endurance in Scenario A 
 




Figure 38.   Platform AHP Results for Endurance in Scenario C 
14. Platform Flexibility Qualitative Assessment 
a. Tactical Satellites 
TacSats, once placed in orbit, cannot be altered and therefore, offer 
limited flexibility.  Additionally, as described earlier, it is very difficult to perform 
an imaging mission and a communications mission simultaneously on the same 
platform because of the orbits needed to accomplish the different missions.   
b. High Altitude Airships 
High Altitude Airships, because of their ability to carry a large 
payload, are able to accomplish both the ISR and communications missions 
simultaneously on the same platform.  Additionally, payloads can be changed 
when the airship returns to its dock.  This payload exchange capability allows for 
sensor upgrades and mission-dependent sensor specialization.  
c. High Altitude UAS 
High Altitude UAS can accomplish the ISR mission to a very high 
level.  However, its payload capacity is packed with ISR equipment leaving little 
room for communications payloads.  Payloads can be changed out as needed, 
but because of its reputation as an ISR platform, its inability to remain on station 
for long periods of time, and its current CONOPS, commanders would be loathe 
to use the Global Hawk as their primary means of long-range communications. 
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d. Medium Altitude UAS 
Medium Altitude UAS mirrors the high altitude UAS in most ways.  
However, the Army is planning multiple variants for the Sky Warrior.  One variant 
will provide some WIN-T communications relay capabilities once WIN-T is 
fielded.123  This variant will not carry missiles or SAR to save the power and 
weight necessary for the communications payload. 
e. Considerations 
As the fight transitions to sustained low-intensity operations this 
attribute may become more important to the warfighter.  Usually at the onset of 
combat operations, where scenario A is the more likely possibility, all available 
assets are brought to bear against the enemy in a combined arms operation.  
Typically, the warfighter is inundated with assets at his disposal and may be hard 
pressed to effectively employ all of them.  However, as troop rotations and 
equipment breakage becomes more apparent over the sustainment of 
operations, this abundance often turns to a scarcity of assets where units often 
are in competition for their use.  Accordingly, flexibility becomes a more highly 
sought after attribute in scenario C than in the previous scenarios.    
15. Platform Flexibility Quantitative Assessment 
Based upon the previously discussed definition, the study based the 
flexibility measurement for each alternative on the ability to perform both ISR and 
communications from a single platform.  The measurement for flexibility was a 
qualitative assessment of each alternative, with each platform scored according 
to the scale depicted in Table 10.   
                                            
123  Short. 
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Table 10.   Flexibility Assessment Scale 
Table 11 depicts the assignment of scores based on the assessment 
scale.  Alternative 1 received the lowest score because of its limited capability to 
conduct both ISR and communications missions from the same platform.  
Typically, ISR satellites fly at LEO for increased resolution.  This orbital 
constraint, however, limits the footprint width of the platform and gives it very 
limited duration of coverage, which makes it less than ideal as a communications 
platform.  Conversely, communications satellites typically fly at HEO for longer 
dwell times over areas of interest to provide uninterrupted communications 
coverage.  HEO orbits, however, are not favorable to electro-optical imaging.  
Characteristically, the configuration design for these platforms accomplishes only 
one or the other of the two missions in our study.  Alternatives 3-4 both have the 
ability to change configurations to accomplish one of the two mission areas.  
Therefore, the assessment of moderately capable applied.  The assessment of 
full mission capability for Alternative 2 is based on the ability to carry multiple 
payloads for both communications and ISR.  The scores shown in Table 11 were 
converted the AHP scale using Equation 1 shown earlier. 
 
 
Table 11.   Qualitative Flexibility Assessment 
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16. Platform Flexibility AHP Results 
The results of the qualitative assessment are shown in Figures 39-41.  
The AHP results show that the HAA's ability to conduct both ISR and 
communications missions simultaneously provides a great advantage for the 
platform over the other alternatives in scenario A.  The capability to arm the UAS 
platforms with different sensors for the specified mission allows them to score 
higher in utility than the satellite platforms. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Platform AHP Results for Flexibility in Scenario A 
 
 





Figure 41.   Platform AHP Results for Flexibility in Scenario C 
H. COMBINING RELATIVE WEIGHTS WITH PLATFORM ANALYSIS 
With relative weights developed for each MOE from our survey of experts, 
and with a comparison score for each alternative based on the qualitative 
analysis, the next step is to combine the relative weights with the platform scores 
using the utility function in Equation 4 for each scenario.   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎡ ⎤= + + + +⎣ ⎦1 2 3 4 5Utility  f   100  X R X A X C X E X F x  
Equation 4:   Alternative Utility Scoring Equation  
The function contains variables for Responsiveness, Access, Coverage, 
Endurance, and Flexibility (R, A, C, E, and F respectively), and treats cost as an 
independent variable.  The variable MOE weights (X1 through X5) for each 
scenario are derived from the survey results.  The platform MOE variables (R, A, 
C, E, and F) are derived from the analysis of platform metrics in each MOE 
category. 
Once the databases for the weights of the MOEs within each scenario and 
the weights for the platforms are populated, Expert Choice 2000 can then 
calculate the overall scores for each platform within each scenario.  Figures 42 
through 44 depict the platform scores for Scenarios A through C respectively, 




which alternative provides the most efficient ISR and communications platform in 
each scenario as a function of the platform qualitative scores and the relative 
weighted preference of each attribute by the survey respondents.  
 
 
Figure 42.   Final Platform Scores for Scenario A 
As Figure 42 depicts, the HEO TacSat platform and the HAA are rated 
equally high in scenario A using the AHP.  This is probably due to the high 
access rating of the HEO platform and the relative weight of access as an 
alternative attribute in this scenario.   Without air superiority, access to denied 
territory is limited with the other platforms.  However, satellite access of denied 
territory is not dependent on air superiority, which is a distinct advantage of the 
TacSat platform in scenario A.  Although the HAA score within the scenario may 
lead the decision maker to believe the preference for both platforms is equal, it is 
important to understand how the AHP achieved these results.  The endurance 
attribute is rated second highest in importance in scenario A.  The HAA 
dominates in this attribute.  Therefore, although the HAA access score is lower, 
the platform's much higher endurance score gives it an overall rating within the 
scenario that is the equivalent of the HEO TacSat.  It is important to realize, 
within this scenario without air superiority, this overall result may only hold true 




while operating in secure airspace.  Without air superiority, if the warfighter 
needs access to denied territory beyond the range of the HAA, only the satellite 
platforms can accomplish the mission.   
 
 
Figure 43.   Final Platform Scores for Scenario B 
As Figure 43 depicts, the HAA platform is rated highest in scenario B 
using the AHP.  The apparent advantage appears to be largely due to the 
platform's superior performance in endurance over the other alternatives.  Once 
air superiority is established, the advantages of having a platform that is able to 
provide persistent coverage is a unique advantage of the HAA over the other ISR 
and communications vehicles.  The HAA also scored high in coverage, the 
second highest MOE. 
 
 
Figure 44.   Final Platform Scores for Scenario C 
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As stated earlier, the GWOT is the primary focus of the DoD and remains 
the most likely mission for the military for the near and mid-term threat 
analysis.124  Scenario C is not dissimilar to ongoing operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Our AHP analysis of ISR and communications platforms shows 
that, within scenario C, the HAA is the preferred alternative (Figure 44).  This is 
not intended to take away from the capabilities of the other systems, like the UAS 
with its strong responsiveness attribute.  Although our survey did not result in 
respondents identifying responsiveness as the most important attribute in 
scenario C, fleeting, high-payoff targets in this environment may require 
platforms that can adjust quickly to changing missions and conduct short 
turnaround times between tasks.  The relative weights of the MOEs for scenario 
C show that our pool of experts considered almost all the attributes (with the 
exception of access) to be of near equal value within the definition of the 
scenario.   
Although scenario C best represents the current operational focus of the 
DoD, it is not representative of the most dangerous course of action for which the 
military must prepare.  In its role to project combat power in support of strategic 
objectives, the United States Army and Marine Corps must prepare for the full 
spectrum of warfare, which the recent eruption of hostilities between Russia and 
Georgia reasserts.  To analyze the impact of the likelihood of each scenario on 
the alternative scores, we weighted each scenario differently and recorded the 
results.  This technique allowed us to analyze the impact on alternative scores by 
increasing the most likely scenario (scenario C) and the most dangerous 
(scenario A).  The overall best choice may change based upon how each 
scenario is weighted.  For comparison, the following four figures show the 
platform scores when all scenarios are evenly weighted and when each scenario 
carries 60% of the weight while the other two scenarios each carry 20% of the 
weight (Figures 45-48). 
                                            
124  Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025. 
 98
 
Figure 45.   Platform Scores With All Scenarios Weighted Evenly 
Figure 45 depicts the AHP results when all scenarios are weighted evenly. 
If the DoD devotes resources to preparation for all three scenarios evenly 
distributed, and it invested in the alternative platforms based on this presumption, 
the AHP shows that the HAA investment would yield the most benefit to the user 
based on the relative weights of the MOEs used in this study and the platform 
qualitative assessment.  Notably, the two platforms most preferred in this 
scenario are the HAA and high altitude UAS, while the LEO TacSat is considered 
the worst choice. 
 
Figure 46.   Overall Platform Scores with Scenario A Weighted Highest 
If scenario A is considered to be the most dangerous course of action for 
which the DoD must be prepared, and then weighted the investment in 
alternatives based on that presumption, then the HAA investment yields the most 
benefit to the user (Figure 46).  The TacSat ability to access denied territory 
despite a lack of air superiority gives it a decided advantage in scenario A, but 
the DoD investment would still have to consider the other scenario possibilities 
and allocate budget amounts (40%) based on the possibility of scenario B or C.  
Using this logic, the HAA yields the highest AHP results.  With the higher rating 
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of the access attribute in scenario A, the HEO TacSat, with its higher access 
score, is rated almost equally with the high altitude UAS.   The LEO platform, 
however, is again scored lowest. 
 
 
Figure 47.   Overall Platform Scores with Scenario B Weighted Highest 
Figure 47 depicts the alternative results when the likelihood of Scenario B 
is higher than the other alternatives.  As the figure shows, if DoD investment in 
alternatives is weighted according to these results, the HAA investment would 
again be highest, followed by the other platforms.  Of note, the LEO satellite 
platform once again scores lowest in effectiveness in scenario B. 
 
 
Figure 48.   Platform Scores with Scenario C Weighted Highest 
Figure 48 depicts the alternative results when the likelihood of Scenario C 
occurring is higher than the other alternatives.  As the figure shows, if DoD 
investment in platforms is weighted according to the AHP results of this 
possibility, then the HAA investment would be highest, followed by the other 
platforms.  The LEO TacSat achieves the lowest effectiveness score when 
scenario C is weighted highest, making it the lowest rated platform across the 
board for both equal weighting of the scenarios and when each scenario is given 
preferential weight based on expected future events. 
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I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter begins by exploring the reasons for, and the importance of, 
the analysis.  The study explored different methods of analysis, such as a cost 
benefit analysis, before deciding that a cost effectiveness analysis with an 
economics approach to be the correct prototype to follow.  We described the 
analysis process and began by exploring different MOEs to fit the study.  Sound 
MOEs were chosen and each platform was assessed against those MOEs.  The 
analysis methodology included a description of the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
and how the study used that process for analysis.  Next, the study used a survey 
of academics and military personnel to determine user preference among the 
MOEs, and then used the AHP to assign weights to each MOE in three different 
scenarios.  We conducted a qualitative assessment of all the platforms in a 
pairwise comparison within each scenario to develop platform AHP scores, which 
we attempted to compare to a quantitative analysis of platform metrics for 
veracity.   
The study combined the MOE weights and platform qualitative 
performance scores to determine the best platform for each scenario.  The best 
overall platform could then be determined by weighting all scenarios evenly or by 
favoring one scenario over the others.  In the following chapter, we will dig 
deeper to study the real effects of budget constraints on investment.  In 
particular, we will analyze fixed budget effects on the platforms, and then explore 
the maximum effectiveness one could achieve based on a variety of alternative 
methods of investment in the platforms analyzed.  Finally, we will also attempt to 






Since September 11, 2001, the need [for bandwidth] has increased 
eight-fold in Central Command due to the war in Afghanistan and 
the pursuit of terrorists in the region.125 
A. DETERMINING COST ALTERNATIVES 
Since cost is used as an independent variable for this study, there is no 
impact due to cost in the AHP analysis process detailed thus far.  However, to 
conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis, the next step is the inclusion of the cost 
variable to determine the impact on overall effectiveness.  Each of the platforms 
analyzed have merit in meeting warfighter demands, and consequently will 
continue to be procured by the DoD.  However, the right mix of platforms should 
be considered in an overarching strategy.  The following are examples of various 
investment alternatives considered.  The total program cost as of September 
2007 of the Global Hawk UAS ($9.6 billion) will be the baseline cost ceiling.126  
The program cost includes money already spent and GAO estimates of the 
money it will take to complete the program through the final procurement of all 
systems.  The following alternatives will be utilized in the comparison for cost-
effectiveness: 
1. All TacSats 
One alternative is to invest the entire amount of funding into LEO and 
HEO tactical satellites.  It is understandable that this is not a practical investment 
strategy, because it would eliminate the inherent capabilities of the other 
platforms.  However, it is a useful technique for gauging the total amount of 
capability the TacSats provide, when compared to the other platforms, if given 
                                            
125  David Hughes, "Pentagon Targets Bandwidth Expansion," Aviation Week and Space Technology 
(2003): 57. 
126  United States. Government Accountability Office., 91. 
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the entire investment amount.  By using the Air Force Research Laboratory cost 
estimate for an average tactical satellite of $87 million (not including launch cost), 
the DoD could purchase 110 LEO TacSats or 110 HEO TacSats.127  Once the 
ORS program advances to the point where TacSat launches become routine, the 
price per satellite will drop closer to the Congressional goal of $40 million per 
small satellite.128  However, once launch costs and satellite control operations 
are factored in, the actual number of satellites purchased would be lower.  
However, Iridium can provide global communications coverage for years with a 
LEO constellation of only 66 small satellites.129  If a TacSat could be made that 
could adequately provide both responsive communications and responsive ISR 
capabilities this alternative might be acceptable.  Figure 49 shows the overall 
effectiveness score for the first alternative using Equation 4 (see Appendix G for 
effectiveness score calculations).  The calculated effectiveness score is based on 
the average platform effectiveness multiplied by the investment purchase of 110 
TacSats. 





Alternative 1 and 2
 
Figure 49.   Alternative 1 and 2 Effectiveness Score 
                                            
127  Government Accountability Office, 11. 
128 Ibid. 
129  Iridium,  August 29, 2008 <http://www.iridium.com/about/about.php>. 
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2. All HAAs 
The second alternative is to invest the entire amount of funding into a 
high-altitude long-endurance airship such as the HAA.  By using the RAND cost 
estimate for a HAA of $50 million each, the DoD could purchase 192 HAAs for 
the expenditure cost of the Global Hawk UAS.130  Operations, maintenance, 
prototype costs, and hangar infrastructure will likely significantly reduce the 
actual number purchased.  However, if only 50 are purchased, one could be 
dedicated to every active duty Army division headquarters and their four brigade 
combat team (BCT) headquarters.  This would significantly enhance 
communications and ISR capabilities for the warfighter commanders.  Figure 50 
shows the overall effectiveness score for the second alternative (see Appendix G 
for effectiveness score calculations).  The calculated effectiveness score is 
based on the average platform effectiveness multiplied by the investment 
purchase of 192 HAAs. 





Figure 50.   Alternative 3 Effectiveness Score  
                                            
130  Jamison, Porche, and Sommer, 8. 
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3. All High-Altitude UAS 
Another alternative is to invest the entire amount of funding into high-
altitude UAS such as the Global Hawk.  According to the Government 
Accountability Office, the Global Hawk program is investing $9.6 billion for 54 
UAS.131  Using the example above, this would be enough Global Hawks for 
every active Army division and BCT headquarters.  However, as an Air Force 
asset and costing nearly $178 million apiece, it is unlikely that these platforms 
would be dedicated to the tactical fight.  Figure 51 shows the overall 
effectiveness score for the third alternative (see Appendix G for effectiveness 
score calculations).  The calculated effectiveness score is based on the average 
platform effectiveness multiplied by the investment purchase of 54 UAS. 





Figure 51.   Alternative 4 Effectiveness Score  
4. All Medium-Altitude UAS 
Another alternative is to invest the entire amount of funding into medium-
altitude UAS such as the Sky Warrior.  The Sky Warrior costs $128 million per 
                                            
131  United States. Government Accountability Office., 91. 
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UAS (the UAS consists of 12 aircraft), or $10.7 million per platform.  For $9.6 
billion, 75 Sky Warrior UAS could be purchased (900 individual platforms).  The 
decision has been made to locate the Sky Warrior at the Army division level.  
With the current plan to purchase 12 UAS, this will be a little more than one per 
division.132  With the 12 platforms per division, it is likely that each of the four 
BCTs will have use of one or two platforms.  75 UAS, or 900 platforms, would 
likely be overkill, but would greatly enhance tactical communications and ISR 
capabilities.  Figure 52 shows the overall effectiveness score for the fourth 
alternative (see Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The calculated 
effectiveness score is based on the average platform effectiveness multiplied by 
the investment purchase of 900 UAS.  This alternative far exceeds the 
effectiveness scores of the other platforms in alternatives 1-3.  This is primarily 
due to the relative low purchase price of the platform in comparison to the other 
vehicles.  Even though the medium-altitude UAS tallied only an average utility 
score (20.4) in comparison to the other platforms, the quantity of platforms 
available within the defined budget constraints is much greater than the other 
alternatives.   





Figure 52.   Alternative 5 Effectiveness Score  
                                            
132  United States. Government Accountability Office., 91. 
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5. Optimized Mix for Scenario A (Most Dangerous Course of 
Action) 
The platform results from Scenario A were used to determine the 
distribution of funds to each platform.  Therefore, with $9.6 billion the breakout 
per platform is as follows: 
LEO TacSats (.185) would be allocated $1.78 billion.   
HEO TacSats (.219) would be allocated $2.10 billion.  Using the 
assumptions stated above, this would equal 20 LEO TacSats and 24 HEO.  
Launch and operations costs will reduce the number of satellites the DoD could 
buy, but with even half as many set up in an optimized constellation, a significant 
level of communications and ISR capabilities could be provided. 
HAA (.219) would be allocated $2.10 billion.  This would be enough to 
purchase 42 HAAs.  Assuming only 20 are bought, and only 10 (50% in reserve) 
are in theater at a time, that would be nearly one per BCT.  They would likely be 
controlled at a level above the BCTs, however, with their great ability for 
persistence, it is likely every tasking a BCT would make would be filled in short 
order. 
Global Hawk (.205) would be allocated $1.97 billion.  This would be 
enough for 11 Global Hawks.  As with the HAA, keeping 50% in reserve would 
dedicate five the current GWOT efforts overseas. 
Sky Warrior (.172) would be allocated $1.65 billion.  This would be enough 
to purchase over 12 UAS (154 platforms).  If 50% were deployed this would give 
each deployed division two UAS (24 platforms) each.  This would be a huge 
increase in current capabilities. 
The effectiveness score depicting the optimized mix for the most 
dangerous course of action is shown in Figure 53.  Overall effectiveness for each 




the effectiveness score of the platform (see Appendix G for effectiveness score 
calculations).  The total effectiveness for alternative 5 is the combination of the 
effectiveness scores of each platform. 









Figure 53.   Alternative 6 Effectiveness Score  
6. Optimized Mix for Scenario B 
Using the same method used for Scenario A, the funds in Scenario B 
would be distributed in the following manner: 
LEO TacSats (.099) would be allocated $0.95 billion.  This would be 
enough for 11 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.135) would be allocated $1.30 billion.  This would be 
enough for 15 HEO TacSats. 
HAA (.316) would be allocated $3.03 billion.  This would be enough for 61 
HAAs. 
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Global Hawks (.246) would be allocated $2.36 billion.  This would be 
enough for 13 Global Hawks. 
Sky Warrior (.204) would be allocated $1.96 billion.  This would be enough 
for over 15 Sky Warrior UAS (183 platforms). 
The effectiveness score depicting the optimized mix for scenario B is 
shown in Figure 54.  Overall effectiveness for each platform is based on the 
number of platforms that can be purchased multiplied by the effectiveness score 
of the platform (see Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total 












Figure 54.   Alternative 7 Effectiveness Score  
7. Optimized Mix for Scenario C (Most Likely Course of Action) 
Using the same method used for Scenarios A and B, the funds in Scenario 
C would be distributed in the following manner: 
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LEO TacSats (.097) would be allocated $0.93 billion. This would be 
enough for 11 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.165) would be allocated $1.58 billion.  This would be 
enough for 18 HEO TacSats 
HAA (.288) would be allocated $2.76 billion.  This would be enough for 55 
HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.231) would be allocated $2.22 billion.  This would be 
enough for 12 Global Hawks. 
Sky Warrior (.219) would be allocated $2.10 billion.  This would be enough 
for 16 Sky Warrior UAS (196 platforms). 
The effectiveness score depicting the optimized mix for the most likely 
course of action is shown in Figure 55.  Overall effectiveness for each platform is 
based on the number of platforms that can be purchased multiplied by the 
effectiveness score of the platform (see Appendix G for effectiveness score 
calculations).  The total effectiveness for alternative 7 is the combination of the 
effectiveness scores of each platform. 
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Figure 55.   Alternative 8 Effectiveness Score  
8. Mix for Evenly Weighted Scenarios  
Using the same method used for Scenarios A, B, and C, the funds in this 
mix would be distributed in the following manner: 
LEO TacSats (.127) would be allocated $1.22 billion. This would be 
enough for 14 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.173) would be allocated $1.66 billion.  This would be 
enough for 19 HEO TacSats. 
HAA (.274) would be allocated $2.63 billion.  This would be enough for 53 
HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.227) would be allocated $2.18 billion.  This would be 
enough for 12 Global Hawks. 
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Sky Warrior (.198) would be allocated $1.90 billion.  This would be enough 
for over 14 Sky Warrior UAS (178 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even weighting of all three scenarios is shown in Figure 56.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 8 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform. 










Figure 56.   Alternative 9 Effectiveness Score  
9. Mix for Scenario A Weighted the Highest 
Using the same method used previously, the funds in this mix would be 
distributed in the following manner: 
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LEO TacSats (.150) would be allocated $1.44 billion. This would be 
enough for 17 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.194) would be allocated $1.83 billion.  This would be 
enough for 21 HEO TacSats. 
HAA (.252) would be allocated $2.42 billion.  This would be enough for 48 
HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.219) would be allocated $2.10 billion.  This would be 
enough for 12 Global Hawks. 
Sky Warrior (.188) would be allocated $1.80 billion.  This would be enough 
for 14 Sky Warrior UAS (169 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even weighting of all three scenarios is shown in Figure 57.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 10 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform. 
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Figure 57.   Alternative 10 Effectiveness Score  
10. Mix for Scenario B Weighted the Highest 
Using the same method used previously, the funds in this mix would be 
distributed in the following manner: 
LEO TacSats (.116) would be allocated $1.11 billion. This would be 
enough for 13 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.158) would be allocated $1.52 billion.  This would be 
enough for 17 HEO TacSats. 
HAA (.291) would be allocated $2.79 billion.  This would be enough for 56 
HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.235) would be allocated $2.26 billion.  This would be 
enough for 13 Global Hawks. 
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Sky Warrior (.200) would be allocated $1.92 billion.  This would be enough 
for more than 14 Sky Warrior UAS (179 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even weighting of all three scenarios is shown in Figure 58.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 11 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform. 










Figure 58.   Alternative 11 Effectiveness Score  
11. Mix for Scenario C Weighted the Highest 
Using the same method used previously, the funds in this mix would be 
distributed in the following manner: 
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LEO TacSats (.115) would be allocated $1.10 billion. This would be 
enough for 13 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.170) would be allocated $1.63 billion.  This would be 
enough for 19 HEO TacSats. 
HAA (.280) would be allocated $2.69 billion.  This would be enough for 54 
HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.229) would be allocated $2.20 billion.  This would be 
enough for 12 Global Hawks. 
Sky Warrior (.206) would be allocated $1.98 billion.  This would be enough 
for over 15 Sky Warrior UAS (185 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even weighting of all three scenarios is shown in Figure 59.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 12 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform. 
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Figure 59.   Alternative 12 Effectiveness Score  
12. Equal Investment in Platforms for Budget of $9.6 Billion 
Using the investment budget of $9.6 billion and evenly dividing the money 
among alternative platforms, the funds in this mix would be distributed in the 
following manner: 
LEO TacSats (.200) would be allocated $1.92 billion. This would be 
enough for 22 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.200) would also be allocated $1.92 billion.  This would be 
enough for 22 HEO TacSats 
HAA (.200) would also be allocated $1.92 billion.  This would be enough 
for 38 HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.200) would also be allocated $1.92 billion.  This would be 
enough for 11 Global Hawks. 
 117
Sky Warrior (.200) would also be allocated $1.92 billion.  This would be 
enough for over 14 Sky Warrior UAS (179 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even distribution of $9.6 billion is depicted Figure 60.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 13 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform. 










Figure 60.   Alternative 13 Effectiveness Score  
13. Equal Investment in Platforms for Budget of $4.8 Billion 
Using the investment budget of $4.8 billion and evenly dividing the money 
among alternative platforms, the funds in this mix would be distributed in the 
following manner: 
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LEO TacSats (.200) would be allocated $0.96 billion. This would be 
enough for 11 LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.200) would also be allocated $0.96 billion.  This would be 
enough for 11 HEO TacSats 
HAA (.200) would also be allocated $0.96 billion.  This would be enough 
for 19 HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.200) would also be allocated $0.96 billion.  This would be 
enough for five Global Hawks. 
Sky Warrior (.200) would also be allocated $0.96 billion.  This would be 
enough for over seven Sky Warrior UAS (90 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even distribution of $4.8 billion is depicted Figure 61.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 14 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform.  
The results shows that the calculations and effectiveness are indeed linear and 
that you will get ½ the effectiveness of the $9.6 billion investment. 
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Figure 61.   Alternative 14 Effectiveness Score  
14. Equal Investment in Platforms for Budget of $1 Billion 
Using the investment budget of $1 billion and evenly dividing the money 
among alternative platforms, the funds in this mix would be distributed in the 
following manner: 
LEO TacSats (.200) would be allocated $200 million. This would be 
enough for two LEO TacSats. 
HEO TacSats (.200) would also be allocated $200 million.  This would be 
enough for two HEO TacSats 
HAA (.200) would also be allocated $200 million.  This would be enough 
for two HAAs. 
Global Hawks (.200) would also be allocated $200 million.  This would be 
enough for one Global Hawks. 
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Sky Warrior (.200) would also be allocated $0.96 billion.  This would be 
enough for a little over one Sky Warrior UAS (19 platforms). 
The effectiveness score when investment in alternative platforms is based 
upon an even distribution of $1 billion is depicted Figure 62.  Overall 
effectiveness for each platform is based on the number of platforms that can be 
purchased multiplied by the average effectiveness score of the platform (see 
Appendix G for effectiveness score calculations).  The total effectiveness for 
alternative 15 is the combination of the effectiveness scores of each platform.  
This shows the total effectiveness that can be achieved for a more modest 
investment. The total effectiveness for alternative 15 is the combination of the 
effectiveness scores of each platform.  The results shows that the calculations 
and effectiveness are indeed linear and that you will get 1/10 the effectiveness of 
the $9.6 billion investment. 










Figure 62.   Alternative 15 Effectiveness Score  
 121
B. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
Figure 60 compares the effectiveness score of all 15 alternatives.  
Alternative 5 immediately jumps out as having the highest effectiveness score by 
a very wide margin.  Its score is nearly 11,000 points higher than the next highest 
alternative (alternative 8).  The reason the score is so high is that you can buy 
nearly 900 Sky-Warriors for $9.6 billion.  Theoretically, this may seem like a 
feasible plan.  In reality, scrapping all other programs and investing all platform 
funding in the Sky-Warrior program is not a realistic way to invest DoD resources 
or maximize ISR and communications platform capability.  Although the medium 
altitude UAS has a modest effectiveness score in comparison to the other 
platforms, the much cheaper price per platform may lead the decision maker to 
believe he can purchase his way to unparalleled capability.  This course of action 
would eliminate the unique capabilities that other platforms bring to the fight that 
the Sky-Warrior is incapable of adequately providing.  It is important to note, 
however, that the effectiveness score for any alternative will increase most when 




Figure 63.   Effectiveness Score Comparison of Alternatives  
Alternative 4 is interesting in that it gets such a low effectiveness score.  It 
barely gets more than twice the effectiveness of alternative 12 for more than nine 
times the budget.  The reason for this is that it is the opposite situation in 
alternative 5.  The Global Hawks are so expensive that you can only buy a few of 
them, even with a large budget, which drops the overall effectiveness of the fleet.  
The decision maker may be inclined to eliminate this platform based on its low 
effectiveness score and high price.  However, for responsiveness on a global 
scale, the high altitude UAS are currently unparalleled.  
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Since investment in a single platform is an unrealistic option, the next 
obvious course for evaluation is to analyze the various alternatives that use 
combinations of platforms to determine which will provide the most effectiveness.  
The next highest scoring alternative is 8.  Alternative 8 is the optimized mix of 
platforms for Scenario C, the most likely course of action.  This alternative 
provides a good mix of all platforms examined in accordance with the platform 
weights established by the comparative analysis.  There is heavy investment in 
the medium altitude UAS in this alternative, which, as stated before, tends to 
drive up the total effectiveness score.   
For the sake of comparison, alternatives 10, 11, and 12 examine the 
impact on effectiveness as the investment budget for alternatives drops.  As 
expected, if the money is evenly divided among the platforms the effectiveness 
score of the alternative drops proportionately in these alternatives.  Most 
interesting may be a closer look at the amount of effectiveness that can be 
obtained by choosing alternative 12, which shows the lowest effectiveness score 
with least amount of investment.  
Using the worst-case scenario (high intensity combat without air 
superiority) as an example, we attempted to identify what level of effectiveness 
alternative 15 would provide to the commander on the ground for 
communications and ISR.  In other words, would the smallest investment used in 
our study provide the necessary capability the commander on the ground would 
require in this scenario?  To use this analogy, we first needed to identify what 
requirements the commander would have from his communications and ISR 
platforms.  They include: 
1. Continuous communications prior to the initiation of offensive 
operations with his battlefield commanders; 
2. Continuous ISR coverage of "close" objectives prior to the initiation 
of operations; 
3. Daily ISR coverage updates of 2-3 "deep" objectives every day for 
future ops planning; 
 124
4. The ability to provide continuous communications on the move after 
crossing the line of departure; 
5. Continuous "eyes forward" for indications and warnings of enemy 
actions/counterattack at the onset of operations from both "close" 
and "deep" targets; 
6. The ability to surge ISR assets onto new targets of opportunity as 
they arise without losing coverage of previously identified 
objectives. 
We can assume that this level of operation would involve, at a minimum, 
units with at least some organic medium-altitude UAS assets (Army division or 
Marine Expeditionary Unit), and that all other assets for support would be tasked 
accordingly.   With these assumptions in place, how well would the commander 
on the ground be supported with the $1 billion investment budget?   
With two high altitude airships, each with a footprint that would cover all of 
North Korea while operating at normal altitude, continuous communications prior 
to the initiation of offensive operations would easily be covered.  If these assets 
were not yet in place, the commander with two HEO TacSats could get four 
hours of communications coverage each day, and incorporate his single Global 
Hawk to provide coverage during any gaps he may have until the HAAs arrive in 
theater.   
Since the HAA platforms at his disposal are capable of providing both 
communications and ISR, the commander would be able to use their sensors to 
provide continuous ISR coverage of “close” objectives before the initiation of 
offensive operations.  Although these platforms would be far back from the 
forward edge of the fight, their sensor footprint would easily access the enemy 
territory that encompasses initial maneuver objectives.  Organic UAS platforms 
could be utilized to provide any additional sensor coverage of objectives the 
commander may desire.   
For targets outside the access area of the HAAs or UAS platforms, the 
commander would have two LEO TacSat ISR platforms at his disposal for this 
scenario.  With the capability these assets provide, deeper targets outside the 
 125
access area of airborne platforms could be covered for future operations.  After 
crossing the line of departure, the commander would be able to see enemy 
reactions and gauge his decisions on critical maneuver and reinforcements 
based on enemy actions well beyond the sensing capability of his organic assets.  
For continuous communications on the move, numerous assets would be 
at the commander’s disposal for the proposed budget.  As friendly forces moved 
across the battlefield and air space coordination areas were established 
overhead, airborne assets could move in conjunction with friendly maneuver to 
provide maximum coverage.  Likewise, the medium-altitude UAS platforms, like 
the Sky Warrior, could provide communications on the move for forces 
maneuvering toward objectives, establishing an overhead communications 
network that maintained a constant footprint over the areas most in need. 
After the initiation of offensive operations, the ground forces commander 
would be able to receive regular coverage of deep targets from both his TacSat 
ISR platforms and Global Hawk UAS.  Simultaneously, if targets of opportunity 
became available and the commander needed to surge assets to provide ISR 
coverage or communications for distributed operations (while maintaining his 
continued capabilities in the main battle area),  the responsiveness of the 
medium-altitude UAS platforms would allow him to provide maneuvering forces 
with the necessary coverage without slowing the tempo of his primary force. 
As one can see from the closer look at the alternative with the least 
amount of investment, the effectiveness that is available to the commander in the 
most dangerous course of action is actually quite abundant.  With the correct mix 
of only a few platforms, the overall ISR and communications capability that he 
can bring to bear is formidable.  Drawing on the individual strengths of the 
platforms in our study and understanding their limitations, an analysis of the 
potential capability that the correct mix of platforms can bring to the fight can help 
commanders utilize these assets to their full potential and help decision makers 
determine the correct mix of investment to support the warfighter.     
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In conclusion, based on the platform effectiveness scores in each 
scenario, the investment in the LEO TacSat platform should be minimal at best.  
The only capability that it brings to the table above the other options is in its 
performance of access in scenario A.  If the warfighter is truly pressed for ISR 
inside denied territory that other platforms cannot reach, then the LEO TacSat 
could be the only option available.  However, for the amount of investment 
involved to provide this capability, decision makers conducting preparations in 
the event of scenario A could task national assets to provide at least as much if 
not more access capability than the LEO TacSat.  The investment for the 
platform could then be used to purchase additional HAA and UAS platforms.  
Outside of scenario A, the LEO TacSat provides little effectiveness that could not 
be attained by the other platforms. 
Likewise, limited investment should be used to purchase the HEO TacSat 
platform in the event the warfighter needs support in scenario A.  The platform 
provides full access in scenario A with greater endurance than the LEO platform, 
making it a useful asset for the warfighter in this scenario.  However, in the other 
scenarios the HEO TacSat has little effectiveness that it brings to the warfighter 
that could not be covered by additional investment in the other platforms.  
Although the medium altitude UAS shows modest effectiveness scores in 
comparison to some of the other platforms, its responsiveness to the warfighter is 
unmatched.  This capability provides the ground commander the ability to surge 
assets to support critical needs far above the other platforms.  Combined with its 
relatively cheap per-platform cost, the benefit of this platform's utility in all three 
scenarios makes it a force multiplier to the warfighter. 
The utility of the HAA and high altitude UAS stand out most in this study.  
By far, the HAA provided the most per-platform utility to the warfighter in this 
study.  Its overwhelming endurance and ability to conduct multiple missions from 
high altitude, provides the warfighter with a tactical advantage for relatively low 
cost (in comparison to the other platforms).  Combined with the proven capability 
of the high altitude UAS, which provides the responsiveness the HAA is lacking, 
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these two platforms allow the warfighter the advantage of being prepared for 
each of the scenarios (worst case and most likely) used in our study. 
C.  HOW CHANGES IN THE MOES COULD IMPACT THE STUDY 
The MOEs are the foundation of the study and by changing them the 
study itself would significantly change.  Many alternative MOEs were explored for 
this study and reasons for not including them were explained in Chapter III.  
Additionally, the authors received some feedback from the survey audience on 
some of their opinions regarding the MOEs that might be useful to consider. 
One survey respondent suggested that access should not be an MOE 
because without access, coverage could not take place and therefore only 
coverage was necessary.   The authors believe he was partially correct in that 
you do need access for coverage.  However, in our imperfect world, we 
frequently do not have access to places that we want to look at.  Therefore, the 
ability to gain access is necessary and a platform that can do that provides a 
significant advantage over platforms that cannot.   
Some respondents did not think that the responsiveness MOE was 
discreet enough, and that it more closely resembled a mix of elements that could 
have been MOEs themselves.  Others thought that responsiveness should have 
been called agility instead.  However, no one thought that it was an irrelevant 
measure or that it did not belong in the trade space at all.   
One respondent thought that the communications and ISR missions are 
so different that they should be separated and evaluated independently.  This is 
a valid suggestion, as the mission set is not usually combined.  It is true that 
most UAS are only geared toward the ISR mission.  It is also true that most 
satellites are specifically configured to conduct ISR or communications, but rarely 
both.  However, there is no physical reason why both missions cannot be 
conducted by the same platform in most circumstances.  The decisions made in 
the mission analysis for the satellite (including the orbitology for the platform) are 
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usually designed to support the optimization of either mission, but this does not 
preclude the possibility, under certain circumstances, that a satellite could be 
both an ISR and communications platform.   
Some suggested that the definition of the coverage MOE was too similar 
to the definition of coverage rate.  This may be a valid statement.  The authors 
made an effort to ensure a clear distinction between the Access and Coverage 
MOEs to eliminate confusion.  Additionally, it is inherently difficult to define a 
figure of merit for coverage.  SMAD lists no less than five different examples.   
Additionally, it warns, “Statistical analysis of inherently non-statistical data, such 
as orbit coverage, can lead to dramatically incorrect conclusions”.133  Therefore, 
there may be some debate about what the best metric should be used for 
coverage.  However, the authors believe that the chosen metric best reflects 
what a ground commander want to know – how long until I get what I asked for. 
Finally, some respondents thought that the definition for endurance used 
in the study more closely resembled persistence or availability.  This is incorrect.  
Persistence is in fact what the DoD is trying to achieve with a variety of platforms.  
Endurance more accurately defines how long a single platform can conduct its 
individual mission. 
D.  HOW CHANGES IN THE SURVEY AUDIENCE COULD IMPACT THE 
STUDY 
The survey audience is an important piece of the survey.  Their opinions 
shape the weights each MOE has with respect to the other MOEs.  Their 
experiences, education, understanding of the MOEs within the context of the 
study, and preconceived opinions of the MOEs all influence the MOE weights 
and therefore the outcome of the analysis once platform metrics are applied.  In 
an ideal study, the survey audience would consist of Army and Marine senior 
commanders, intelligence and operations officers with at least one tour in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  This population would have recent direct experience with 
                                            
133  Larson and Wertz, 173. 
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successes or failures with current communications and ISR collection 
capabilities.  Most of the population would also likely have some experience with 
the success or failure of current UAS platforms to deliver the type and quality of 
ISR products requested.   
This is not to say that the conclusions of the survey population for this 
thesis should be discounted.  The survey population included several academic 
professors with extensive military experience, and a number of Army and Marine 
field grade officers, several with experience in Iraq.  The population used 
provides a well-rounded and educated group with a good understanding of the 
problem and similar experiences to draw from.  The results were well within the 
consistency allowances of the AHP making the data mathematically acceptable.  
Additionally, the survey results were generally along the lines of what the authors 
predicted the outcome would be.   
E.  AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY AND ANALYSIS 
There are a number of different areas in this study that could have been 
expanded and explored further.   First, additional unclassified platforms could 
have been included in the pool of those considered.  Specifically, additional high-
altitude long-endurance experiments such as the Global Observer might be 
useful to look at.  Foreign projects were not looked at and may add some value.  
Additionally, there are also a number of free-floating balloon systems that have 
shown some limited success and may be useful to consider.  This study should 
be repeated in a couple of years after the HAA prototype, Sky-Warrior, TacSat-4, 
and the Global Hawk RQ-4B have been completed and fully tested.  After first 
flight, a better understanding of their potential capabilities and costs will be better 
understood. 
For reasons explained earlier, this study did not focus on the platform 
sensors but on the platforms themselves.  If this were changed, and if a 
platform’s sensor payload far exceeded the capabilities of other platforms’ 
payloads then this could give it an advantage.  This may apply to the HAA where 
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its payload mass and volume are considerably larger than the other platforms.  
The quality of the HAA sensor might not be significantly greater, but the quantity 
might be.  This would give it the advantage of providing coverage more quickly 
and possibly add new capabilities not considered on current UAS because of 
their lack of mass or volume. 
Additional elements that may warrant study are risk factors such as 
performance, cost, schedule, and budget for all representative platforms.  The 
Global Hawk is the only platform that has actually seen action, but the new 
upgraded version of the Global Hawk, the Global Hawk RQ-4B, has encountered 
some developmental issues and the TacSats continue to encounter launch 
delays.134  Therefore, all the platforms discussed could meet setbacks that could 
alter their cost or estimated delivery date.  These risk factors will be different for 
each platform and may influence the amount of time and investment the DoD will 
devote to them.  Additional study on these factors would determine the platforms 
with the greatest assumed risk and would alter the platforms score if risk were 
considered as a MOE. 
An additional classified study could be conducted using the same 
processes but including current and planned national space assets, the U-2, and 
other classified aerial platforms and sensors.  This would broaden the platform 
base and possibly reveal a new best, or worst, platform.  It would also allow for a 
better assessment of the classified capabilities of the platforms currently in the 
study. 
Additionally, there are alternate methods of applying the AHP such as 
variations of the AHP developed by Dr. Francois Melese, Professor of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI).  This 
method begins with creating an objective hierarchy.  The objective is defined by 
the goals, objectives or performance of the object of the study. MOEs are 
developed that best represent the objective.  MOEs are weighted with a survey of 
                                            
134  United States. Government Accountability Office. 92. 
 131
experts in the field.  Once the survey results are tabulated, an additional step of 
going back to the survey population with some metrics for each MOE and 
determining how much of one MOE they would be willing to sacrifice for a gain in 
another MOE when all other MOEs are held constant is taken.  This method 
requires additional time from each respondent but would insure consistency or 
reveal inconsistency in a survey respondent’s initial answers.  This method might 
also offer additional insights into what the respondents truly value and may cause 
the respondents to alter their initial conclusions and answers.135   
Next, alternatives are defined with various systems or capabilities that can 
currently meet or fulfill most of the objective.  To compare these capabilities or 
systems, this method creates an ideal system by using the best characteristics 
from all the systems and then measuring each system against the ideal.  This 
would allow you to see how much of the ideal you are getting with an individual 
platform.  Next, several alternatives are created with various mixes of systems in 
an effort to get as close to the ideal as possible.   
Then, a likely budget is defined.  The effectiveness of each mix is 
compared to the cost of each mix.  The goal is to choose the most effective mix 
that meets budget constraints.  Finally, other factors such as schedule and risks 
are factored into the decision.  Risks include performance, cost, schedule 
slippages and budget changes.  
 F. SUMMARY 
In summary, this study conducted a detailed cost-effectiveness analysis 
on five potential systems for use as a persistent communications and ISR 
platform.  In particular, the thesis authors conducted a survey to determine how 
to weight platform criteria in various militarily relevant scenarios.  Next, it 
measured the performance of each platform against the criteria and used the 
personal experiences of the authors to validate how they would most likely be 
                                            
135  Francois Melese, Discussion on Variations of the Analytical Hierarchy Process, 2008. 
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employed to aid in ground tactical operations.  The results were then combined in 
the mathematically rigorous Analytical Hierarch Process to determine how well 
each platform did.  The cost of the platforms were then analyzed and applied to 
the AHP to determine an optimal mix of platforms for each scenario.  The 
scenario weights were adjusted to allow for preference of one scenario over the 
others.  This showed the cost for the required platforms and the associated level 
of effectiveness for each scenario.  A number of mixed platform alternatives were 
examined to determine the most effective mix of platforms to be employed for a 
set cost.  Alternative 8, the optimized mix for Scenario C, (low intensity 
operations with air superiority and the most likely course of action) had the 
highest effectiveness score when all platforms were employed.    
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APPENDIX B:  PAIR-WISE COMPARISON SURVEY 
UAS, HALE Airship, TacSat Attribute Survey 
 
Please complete and return to jckacala@nps.edu or cmcollie@nps.edu NLT 
14 AUG.  Thank you for your time and participation. 
 
Who we are: MAJ Jeff Kacala (USA) and Maj. Corey Collier (USMC) are 
graduate students attending the Naval Postgraduate School working toward a 
MS in Space Systems Operations. 
 
Survey Purpose: To survey a group of experts to accurately weight the critical 
attributes of a persistent ISR/communications platform for thesis purposes. 
 
Thesis Information: 
 Thesis Statement: The current DoD investment in medium altitude, high 
altitude, and tactical space persistent ISR and Communications platforms does 
not currently meet warfighter operational requirements. 
Thesis Purpose: 1) To capture in one place key information relevant to 
persistent ISR and communications platforms and 2) To conduct a sound cost 
effectiveness analysis to determine the best use of future DoD research and 
development and procurement funds in the area of persistent ISR and 
communications platforms. 
Thesis Scope: This thesis will bound its analysis by constraining itself to 
one medium altitude, high altitude, and tactical space representative platform 
measured against the following five attributes: responsiveness, access, 
coverage, endurance, and flexibility. 
 
The following is a list of attributes to be used in our thesis and their definitions: 
 
1) Responsiveness: The ability to react to new missions in a different 
geographical area and begin passing the user actionable data.  Additionally, it is 
the ability to replace the asset if lost. 
 
2) Access: The geographic extent of what the payload can see over time – i.e. no 
time limit; for example, a single satellite in polar orbit has a global access area  
 
3) Coverage: An indication of how quickly the system can view the access area 
measured in km2/hour 
 
4) Endurance: This is the continuous amount of time a platform can spend over 
the target area. 
 
5) Flexibility: The ability to use the same asset to perform more than one mission. 
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Survey Directions: For each scenario, please fill in the blank with the number 
(between 0 and 5) of times more important one persistent ISR/communications 
platform attribute is over another.  If you feel the two attributes are equally 
important use 1.  If you feel that the bold attribute is less important than the 
attribute you are comparing it to then you can use a fraction (i.e. attribute 1 is 
0.5 times as important as attribute 2). 
 
Scenario A: The United States is conducting high intensity operations without air 
superiority. 
 
Responsiveness is ___ times more important than Access, is ___ time more 
important than Coverage, is ___ times more important than Endurance, and ___ 
times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Access is ___ times more important than Coverage, is ___ times more important 
than Endurance, and is ___ times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Coverage is ___ times more important than Endurance, and ___ times more 
important than Flexibility. 
 
Endurance is ___ times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Scenario B: The United States is conducting high intensity operations with air 
superiority. 
 
Responsiveness is ___ times more important than Access, is ___ time more 
important than Coverage, is ___ times more important than Endurance, and ___ 
times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Access is ___ times more important than Coverage, is ___ times more important 
than Endurance, and is ___ times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Coverage is ___ times more important than Endurance, and ___ times more 
important than Flexibility. 
 
Endurance is ___ times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Scenario C: The United States is conducting low intensity operations with air 
superiority. 
 
Responsiveness is ___ times more important than Access, is ___ time more 
important than Coverage, is ___ times more important than Endurance, and ___ 
times more important than Flexibility. 
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Access is ___ times more important than Coverage, is ___ times more important 
than Endurance, and is ___ times more important than Flexibility. 
 
Coverage is ___ times more important than Endurance, and ___ times more 
important than Flexibility. 
 













Does endurance need to be contiguous?  Would you rather have a platform that 
can provide 4 straight hours of coverage or a platform that can provide 8 hours of 
coverage in 15 minute blocks? 
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APPENDIX C:  PLATFORM PARAMETRIC COMPARISON TABLE  
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APPENDIX E:  ACCESS CALCULATION TABLE 
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